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Introduction 
Since the 1960s, there has been a proliferation of social movements demanding            
recognition of their cultural, racial, and linguistic identities throughout the western world.            
Movements such as the Black Power Movement, the Chicano (and general Latinx) Movement,             
questions of Native American sovereignty, and questions of Quebecian sovereignty in Canada            
have all led philosophers to consider a series of interrelated questions about what role              
governmental institutions should play in acknowledging, fostering, and helping these          
movements’ claims of recognition. The demands for recognition by these groups have emerged             
for a few reasons. One of them is a sense of relative deprivation, ​i.e.​, the sense that relative to the                    
cultural acceptance and hegemony of white, western, male institutional standards and cultural            
expectations, these social groups have been marginalized by western institutions. Another is to             
combat the harmful stereotypes and biases that surround their identities, which hinder both             
their economic mobility and sense of self-respect. Given the political influence of these             
movements and the fascinating questions the demands of these movements imply, it should be              
unsurprising that a rich political philosophy has emerged, expounding reasons for these identity             
movements. This political philosophy is multiculturalism, and though there is great variation            
within the tradition, both liberal and illiberal, the primary unifying belief is that governmental              
institutions should provide permanent, codified, group-differentiated rights to help protect and           
preserve the identities of those minority groups.  
Multiculturalism most fundamentally contends that liberal individualism has failed to          
address the social and economic inequalities faced by racial, cultural, and sexual minorities in              
the western world. In particular, multicultural theorists often point toward two ways in which              
liberalism fails to properly accommodate minority groups. First, they attack the liberal view that              
individuals should act as the only unit of concern when thinking about justice. Multiculturalists              
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view this as too narrow a conception of the person. People define and orient themselves within                
groups they are born into, and therefore groups of people must also be accommodated as               
discrete units of concern. Underpinning this criticism is a view that society should consider the               
particular parts of our identities, ​e.g.​, one’s status as black or as Native American. When we give                 
these particularities the normative import that multicultural theorists request, then group rights            
become essential to protecting and preserving those particular identities. 
Intertwined with the use of group-differentiation to create a more complex view of             
equality is the issue of legal equality. Multicultural theorists challenge the liberal belief that laws               
and the pursuit of justice must be applied to all people with formal equality. They consider this                 
view too rigid and instead advocate for laws that take account of as much cultural and historical                 
context as possible when establishing judicial, legal, and political decision-making procedures.           
That process might well generate laws that treat groups of people differently, but such changes               
are justifiable so long as the outcomes are more equitable. 
This thesis seeks to refute multiculturalism’s advocacy for group rights and offer a             
compromise on the issue of formal equality. I will do this by arguing that group rights will                 
inevitably lead to intolerable injustices, and offer ways that liberal individualism can offer             
principled compromises to the concerns of multiculturalism through individual rights.  
I grant that the liberalism, embodied in works such as John Rawls’ ​A Theory of Justice​,                
has often been insufficiently attentive to many of the problems multiculturalism highlights, but             
it does not follow that the solutions multicultural theorists like Charles Taylor, Iris Marion              
Young and Will Kymlicka have suggested are necessary, much less desirable, to solve many of               
the problems they raise. Liberal individualism can do more to address their concerns than their               
theories credit. Though I hope to find compromise in some areas, there are several problems               
that substantial liberalism and multiculturalism fundamentally disagree on. I believe that           
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several problems, such as the debates over the existence of social goods and permanent              
group-differentiated rights, are irreconcilable and must be decided one way or the other. I will               
defend the liberal view in each of these cases. Thus, I contend that when multiculturalism               
conflicts with liberalism, liberalism can address the valid criticisms that multiculturalism           
advances, and when liberalism cannot acquiesce to its criticisms, liberalism should not. 
I have divided this thesis into four sections. In the first section, I will explore the                
foundational ideas of the liberal egalitarian tradition to establish some principles that will serve              
as the basis for the solutions I advocate for in the final section. The liberal egalitarian principles                 
I explicate will also establish the liberal principles that Charles Taylor, Iris Marion Young, and               
Will Kymlicka challenge. In the second section, I will explore their objections through their              
respective works, ​Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (1994), ​Justice and           
the Politics of Difference (1990), and ​Multicultural Citizenship (1995). The third section will put              
forth the problems inherent to their theories and of multiculturalism as a component in a theory                
of justice. I consider these objections to multiculturalism conclusive, and they together explain             
why the multicultural framework should be abandoned in favor of the revised liberal egalitarian              
framework I will propose and expound in the fourth section. 
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Section 1: The Liberal Egalitarian Framework 
John Rawls’ political thought, expounded in ​A Theory of Justice (1971), will be my most               
immediate text when I say “liberal egalitarian”. The hope for this thesis, though, is that the                
outline I provide for what a liberal egalitarian believes is broad enough that all members of the                 
liberal egalitarian genealogy who endorse substantial liberalism can find my proposal           
acceptable. For instance, my exegetical claims about liberal egalitarianism make no use of             
primary goods or the difference principle to explain the basic principles of justice, despite their               
central role in Rawls’ own theory. 
 
There are three broad principles that most irreducibly define the liberal egalitarian            
paradigm, all stemming from a belief that the ultimate goal of justice is to create a society of free                   
and equal citizens. They are to establish a political process which considers the every citizen               
within the creation of law, provide the means for individuals to pursue basic life plans, and to                 
make as few state commitments to conceptions of the good as possible. 
The first way these principles manifest is the belief that citizens of a polity are due equal                  
consideration within the process of crafting legislation and the effects of that legislation are              
justifiable to all citizens. This belief is at the heart of Rawls’ entire project in ​A Theory of Justice​.                   
Rawls advocates for democracy because he believes it is the closest form of government one can                
get to achieving “the viewpoint of a suitably defined initial situation of equality,” which to him is                 
1
the original position; a thought experiment he devised in which individuals establish principles             
of justice from a position of pure political equality. Rawls secures this equality by placing the                
individuals drafting the principles of justice behind a “veil of ignorance”, behind which the              
members of the original positions have no knowledge of  
his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the                  
distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like.             
Nor, again, does anyone know his conception of the good, the particulars of his rational               
plan of life, or even the special features of his psychology such as his aversion to risk or                  
liability to optimism or pessimism.  
2
 
1  John Rawls, ​A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition​ (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2nd ed. 
1971, 1999), 194. 
2 Ibid, 118. 
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From behind the veil of ignorance, the individuals in the original position select principles of               
justice. Rawls explicitly connects the original position to democracy several times, both in ​A              
Theory of Justice​, “The principle of participation transfers this notion [of equal representation]             
from the original position to the constitution as the highest-order system of social rules for               
making rules,” and in subsequent work, “The idea is to incorporate into the basic structure of                
3
society an effective political procedure which mirrors in that structure the fair representation of              
persons achieved by the original position.”  As for political participation, Rawls argues that 
4
the principle of liberty, when applied to the political procedure defined by the             
constitution, I shall refer to as the principle of (equal) participation. It requires that all               
citizens are to have an equal right to take part in, and to determine the outcome of the                  
constitutional process that establishes the laws with which they are to comply.   
5
 
To be a liberal egalitarian is to believe that everyone deserves equal consideration under the law                
and in its creation, the most obvious proxy to this principle being democratic government.  
 The second policy stemming from the liberal egalitarian desire for a society of free and               
equal citizens is that society, most commonly through the state, must mitigate economic             
inequalities. ​Philosophers have offered a number of reasons for such a policy, but the one most                
relevant to their commitment to equality also highlights the importance of respect. For instance,              
many claim that at a certain point, too much inequality undermines the equal respect and               
consideration owed to each in virtue of their citizenship, as unchecked capitalist economies by              
their nature allow the wealthy to buy undue influence and power over the political process.               
Thus, wealth inequality creates a ​de facto political inequality, which is unacceptable.            
Additionally, Rawls defends the difference principle -- his redistributive principle in which            
inequalities are considered justifiable ​iff they are to the greatest advantage of the least well off --                 
3 Ibid, 195. 
4 ​John Rawls, “The Basic Liberties and Their Priority”, (The Tanner Lectures on Human Values. 10 Apr. 
1981, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan), 45. 
5 ​A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition​, 194. 
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through its ability to combat certain social inequalities: “it provides an interpretation of the              
principle of fraternity… fraternity is held to represent a certain equality of social esteem              
manifest in various public considerations and in the absence of manners of deference and              
servility.” Though Rawls is referring specifically to the difference principle, a similar logic             
6
applies to other conceptions of wealth redistribution. That is, when inequality becomes too             
great, citizens of the same country begin experiencing egregiously different lives, which            
undermines a common sense of destiny that is so essential to the social and political life of a                  
nation. How exactly a country should redistribute wealth is an issue I am deliberately remaining               
agnostic on for this thesis, as redistributive principles have manifested in innumerable ways             
throughout the liberal egalitarian tradition. The basic reasoning and moral impulse behind all of              
these principles, however, remains the same. 
Lastly, liberal egalitarians believe that the state should, as far as possible, respect the              
varying conceptions of the good life that citizens forge. Rawls refers to justice creating a               
“procedural republic” as a result. This initially seems like a strange ideological belief to commit               
to, yet for the founders of the liberal egalitarian tradition -- Rawls and Ronald Dworkin -- it is an                   
essential element of their political philosophy. The reason why they place so much emphasis on               
this doctrine derives again from the fundamental belief that justice is about creating a society of                
free and equal citizens. For that to occur, the state must demonstrate an equal level of respect to                  
its citizens. If the state begins interfering in what people’s good lives entail, then the state is now                  
claiming that some people’s conceptions of the good life are not worthy of equal respect. Rawls                
conceives of the state as “the association consisting of equal citizens. It [the state] does not                
concern itself with philosophical and religious doctrine but regulates individuals’ pursuit of their             
moral and spiritual interests…” . Dworkin states the idea even more explicitly when he             
7
6 Ibid, 90.  
7 ​A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition​, 186.  
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comments that, “Governments must treat those whom it governs with concern... that is, as              
human beings who are capable of forming and acting on intelligent conceptions of how their               
lives should be lived. … It must not constrain liberty on the ground that one citizen’s conception                 
of the good life of one group is nobler or superior than another’s.” If society is going to achieve a                    
8
just institutional arrangement according to liberal egalitarian principles, then the state cannot            
interfere in people’s life plans. To do so is to show contempt for people’s abilities to lead their                  
lives, implying a level of disrespect that undermines the claim that citizens are free and equal. 
When we combine those three tenets together we can appreciate the socio-political            
architectonic that liberal egalitarianism has created. Because justice is about creating a society of              
free and equal citizens, everyone is due a chance to participate in the political process and is due                  
equal consideration when laws and policies are crafted. This equal respect also restricts the              
government’s ability to interfere in someone’s conception of the good life provided that good life               
does not violate the liberties of someone else. However, economic redistribution is permissible,             
and perhaps even necessary, for two reasons. People’s conceptions of the good life require the               
resources to pursue that good life, and in a capitalist economy, there is no guarantee that people                 
will have access to those resources even if they work full-time due to the nature of a labor                  
market. Thus, redistribution is needed to guarantee that citizens are able to pursue their good               
life. Secondly, when the lives of the wealthy and poor are too disparate, it is impossible that they                  
are given an equal level of respect because how inequality leads to fundamental divisions in the                
experiences of society, not to mention risk of corruption within a society in which money is such                 
a dominant force. 
Though they are advocates for redistribution and other more ‘collectivist’ economic           
programs, liberal egalitarians are still liberals in the tradition of Locke, Kant, and Mill. They are                
8 Ronald Dworkin, “What Rights do we Have?”, in ​Taking Rights Seriously​ (Oxford UK: Duckworth 
Publishing, 6th ed. 1977, 1991), 272-273. 
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therefore committed to the sovereignty of the individual as the basis for social concern and to                
the good of autonomy as a social value. Although there are several different but plausible ways to                 
conceive of what a commitment to individualism entails, for the purposes of this thesis the one                
worth expanding is substantial liberalism, which I am advocating for throughout the paper. The              
view holds for the supremacy of the individual as the basis of social concern, demanding that                
“rights must always attach to individuals: that human rights, as framed in our conventions and               
in law, should always be the rights of persons, not groups.” I believe the majority of liberal                 
9
egalitarians are substantive liberals. For instance, Rawls’ substantial liberalism is an implicit            
result of the veil of ignorance stripping every individual of their collective identity and arguing               
principles of justice emerge from the rational self-interest of the individual alone.  
Substantial liberalism has several compelling elements. First, the view, properly          
exemplified, sees each individual as the only entity capable of being an end in itself, eschewing                
any attempt to categorize individuals by means beyond their actions. It is thus an excellent               
principled rejection of several common forms of discrimination and racism, such as the desire to               
conflate the actions of one member of a group to the qualities of the entire group. Under                 
substantial liberalism, one’s membership to a minority group should not indicate anything            
beyond the actions of that individual person. It is those actions that are then evaluated. This is                 
not to deny the effects of racial biases, or the fact that we do often categorize and judge people                   
for membership to groups. Rather, what substantial liberalism claims is that this is deeply              
wrong, and that the obligation to fight racial biases is precisely because these categorizations              
deprive individuals of their ability to be viewed as their own selves with their own conception of                 
the good. 
9 Kwame Anthony Appiah, ​Ethics of Identity​ (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 72 
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Secondly, the view makes a great deal of common sense in that individuals are tangible,               
obviously discrete units of moral concern. I can see ten people and know that each one of them                  
is an individual who deserves an equal amount of respect. More importantly for political              
philosophy, the government can easily identify individuals as citizens and thus base policies             
around these individuals. This does not mean that the government ignores the ways individuals              
are impacted as groups, but rather acknowledges how it is always the individuals within those               
groups who are experiencing whatever discrimination or benefit that group does. As I will              
develop in the third section, treating groups as a unit of concern in the same way individuals are                  
treated under substantial liberalism is fraught with difficulty. Groups are comparatively           
amorphous and thus harder to define, especially when trying to determine who belongs in the               
group and what involvement in a group entitles one to. Under substantial liberalism, we can               
know easily who deserves legal rights and benefits -- each individual. 
One implication from the liberal egalitarian architectonic, owing to its influence from            
Mill and Kant, is the value placed on autonomy. Because of the critical role the idea of autonomy                  
places in the debates surrounding multiculturalism, I think it is worthwhile to quickly offer an               
idea of why autonomy can and should be considered a value worth prioritizing in a theory of                 
justice. I have no ambition of solving the debates surrounding autonomy in this short section,               
because it has often been one of the most intractable since the contemporary explosion in               
political philosophy. What I want to weigh in on quickly is the communitarian criticism of liberal                
autonomy that some ends are so constitutive that they are beyond reflection and therefore              
revision.  
Using the word autonomy in political philosophy often invokes what Kwame Anthony             
Appiah calls “strong autonomy”, which one can only achieve once that individual distances             
themself from social pressures, acts on principles only when they have critically reflected upon              
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them, and is immune, or at least resistant to social and cultural forces that deviate from their                 
principles. This standard is of course far too high for what a society can reasonably expect                
10
ordinary people to practice in their daily life. It would require that every individual read               
extensively into the philosophical literature to expand the ends that they can strive for, every               
person would need to very carefully and deliberately analyze their biases and preferences to              
minimize the degree they are affecting their decisions. In a sense, strong autonomy seems to               
demand that we abstract ourselves away from our culture and institutions until we are no more                
than members of the original position. To expect such idealized rationality is far too strong, and                
the communitarians have correctly pushed against this conception of autonomy. For one, it does              
not acknowledge the way that our choices are framed and constrained by the social and cultural                
context we live in. As Alasdair MacIntyre notes, “behavior is only characterized adequately when              
we know what the longer and longest-term intentions invoked are and how the shorter-term              
intentions are related to the longer. Once again we are involved in writing a narrative history.”                
11
These “narrative histories” only make sense when we have access to the cultural and social               
context of the narrative in which that person is making their decisions. When something              
becomes a part of one’s conception of the good life, that necessarily entails a commitment to it                 
that requires more investment from our sense of self and identity than strong autonomy can               
allow. To use Sandel's concepts in ​Liberalism and the Limits of Justice​, autonomy is not of                
paramount importance insofar as it keeps us permanently unencumbered selves who only ever             
possess our ends of life, “To imagine a person incapable of constitutive attachments such as               
these is not to imagine an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a person wholly without                  
10 Appiah’s characterization of “strong autonomy” is found on pages 37-38 of ​Ethics of Identity​. 
11 Alasdair MacIntyre, ​After Virtue​ (Notre Dame IN: Notre Dame Press. 2nd ed. 1981, 1984), 208. 
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character, without moral depth.” MacIntyre echoes Sandel’s skepticism for the possibility of            
12
revising our ends,  
Without those moral particularities to begin from there would never be anywhere to             
begin; but it is in moving forward from such particularity that the search for the good, for                 
the universal, consists. ... What I am, therefore, is in key part what I inherit, a specific                 
past that is present to some degree in my present. I find myself part of a history and that                   
is generally to say, whether I like it or not, whether I recognize it or not, one of the                   
bearers of a tradition.  
13
 
For the communitarian, the constitutive ends that we pursue are not just part of us, they are us.                  
It is subsequently incoherent to think of needing the state to prioritize autonomy in order to                
revise one’s ends.  
I agree with the communitarian that constitutive ends are an inevitable part of human              
attachment, and so any attempt to establish a grounding for autonomy has to respect this fact.                
We should be careful to note that liberal egalitarianism is not committed to strong autonomy or                
any view of the person who is somehow beyond the confines of their cultural context. The noted                 
communitarian thinker Michael Walzer concedes this point readily: “contemporary liberals are           
not committed to a presocial self, but only to a self capable of reflecting critically on the values                  
that have governed its socialization; and communitarian critics, who are doing exactly that, can              
hardly go on to claim that socialization is everything.” Thus, communitarians overextend their             
14
criticism of autonomy if they conflate someone defending the good of autonomy with the good of                
strong autonomy, ​i.e. if they conflate critical reflection of constitutive ends with the belief that               
people should only ever possess their ends. But once we uncouple those two forms of autonomy,                
their argument that our ends are beyond critical reflection is significantly weaker. Rational,             
reflective abilities capable of questioning one’s conception of the good are possible and             
12 Michael J. Sandel, ​Liberalism and the Limits of Justice​. (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press. 
2nd ed. 1982, 1998), 179 
13 ​After Virtue,​ 221. 
14 Michael Walzer, “The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism,” ​Political Theory​ 18, no. 1 (1990): 21. 
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necessary for people when revising their ends. The communitarian claim that some ends are              
beyond revision is false. Dworkin has correctly noted that the communitarians are making two              
separate claims: first, that people develop themselves and their identities within communities            
that set the boundaries of their imaginations, and secondly that these attachments are so              
important and constitutive that the individuals involved in them cannot revise them. The first              
claim I do not dispute (and no one should), but the second is false: 
No doubt it is impossible for someone to detach himself from all associations and              
connections in considering what kind of life to lead. No one can think intelligibly about               
that question prescinding from every aspect of the context in which he lives. So no one                
can put everything about himself in question all at once. But it hardly follows that for                
each person there is some one connection or association so fundamental that it cannot be               
detached for inspection while holding others in place.  
15
 
In light of these two contrasting visions of the self -- as free and autonomous and                
inextricably situated in a cultural context beyond revision -- Yael Tamir has advocated for a               
middle path between strong autonomy and communitarian ends. Tamir notes that if choosing             
one’s ends were not possible in the ways communitarians seem to imply, then the many ways                
that communities have often restricted individuals’ ability to leave those communities makes no             
sense. She also notes the ways that communal identities have gone out of existence or been                
16
repressed and then revived, or how groups have voluntarily assimilated upon immigrating.            
17
This is all to highlight the deep fluidity of culture and community, as well as exemplifying how                 
even communities and cultures have acknowledged an individual’s ability to question and revise             
those facets of their life, which is at odds with the communitarian conception of the self and                 
their subsequent rejection of autonomy as a good worth fostering What Tamir develops is a               
nuanced conception of a person who “can reflect, evaluate, and choose his conception of the               
good, his ends, and his cultural and national affiliations, but is capable of such choices because                
15 Ronald Dworkin, “Liberal Community,” California Law Review  77 no. 3, (1989): 489 
16 Yael Tamir, ​Liberal Nationalism​ (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 27. 
17 Ibid, 28.  
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he is situated in a particular socialand cultural environment that offers him evaluative criteria.”              
18
She calls this person a “contextual individual” and it is this contextualized mode of choice that                
autonomy is really designed to preserve. 
What prioritizing autonomy is critical for in my view is maintaining the liberty of all               
citizens -- both when they are pursuing their ends as well as revising them. My defense of                 
autonomy is a weaker, conditional claim than strong autonomy: If people choose to revise their               
ends, then the state should make no comment on what ends they should pursue. While we                
cannot expect people to always revise their ends, people are still able to do so. People change                 
their religion, they leave their family or hometown, and some even abandon their country of               
birth. These revisions of ends are unusual in that those decisions often emerge out of painful                
necessity, but they do occur. Where the state’s neutrality on ends and preservation of autonomy               
is needed is to avoid hindering any person’s decision to abandon their constitutive ends. If the                
state and laws are designed to reinforce particular conceptions of the good life, then efforts to                
break away from those “ends”, if people want to, become even more challenging than the               
psychological challenges inherent in such a decision. The maintenance of autonomy is to assure              
that should people need or want to revise their ends, that such a decision is available to them. It                   
is for that need, in order to always preserve the liberty of citizens, that autonomy must be viewed                  
a good worth fostering. This is also an endorsement of the importance of education, which is                
almost always the best way to expand the field of options that individuals have to choose from                 
when deciding upon what ends they wish to follow. The state must make education, and               
education of other cultures, available, both because it develops internationally-engaged citizens,           
and because it makes those citizens better able to imagine the possibilities of life beyond the                
conception of the good they are born into, and perhaps find another that suits them better.  
18 Ibid, 33.  
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There are two implications from conceiving of people as “contextualized individuals” that            
matter for a debate about multiculturalism. First, the capacity for critical reflection about one’s              
ends precludes the communitarian and subsequently multicultural belief that cultural          
attachment is so necessary for human ends that autonomy is subordinate to those ends. The               
capacity to choose is possible, and when someone opts to exercise it, those choices create a                
meaningful and invaluable way for that person to have control over their life and have a sense of                  
self. Community matters for developing a sense of self, but it matters just as much that the                 
person have chosen that community because it is a reflection of the good life they want.                
Respecting autonomy is necessary for people if they have the realization that the ends they are                
pursuing are no longer worthwhile to them. Because individuals are capable of revising their              
ends, the challenge facing multiculturalism is how to maintain a minority group’s existence             
within a larger polity without restricting the freedom of the members in that minority society,               
both within the group and, if they so choose, to leave it. I will argue that multiculturalism has no                   
answer to this challenge, though Will Kymlicka comes tantalizingly close. The second            
implication is more consequential for general political philosophy, namely that because our ends             
can be revised, they lose any status as necessary or nonnegotiable. The individual’s desire to               
maintain a conception of the good that creates injustice is not an acceptable reason to abnegate                
respect for one’s fellow person, and therefore individuals’ conceptions of the good are             
subordinate to the demands of a society that strives for free and equal citizens. 
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Section 2: Multicultural Dissent 
 
The second section is purely an exegetical discussion of the three major multicultural views,              
which are, in order: Charles Taylor’s, Iris Marion Young’s, and Will Kymlicka’s. The form of               
multiculturalism that they each present is quite distinct from each other’s. I must unfortunately              
elide over many of these theoretical differences because I am more interested in the flaws they                
all share, rather than picking apart each of their theories. So their differences will not matter                
because it is their common features which I am skeptical of. My point is to show that even                  
multicultural theories grounded on totally different bases -- communitarianism,         
postmodernism, and liberalism -- all share the same fundamental flaws, which I believe             
supports my basic suspicion that it is multiculturalism itself that has the problems I will outline                
in section 3, not just one specific theory.  
 
Charles Taylor’s theory in “The Politics of Recognition” has exerted an enormous influence on              
the multicultural literature, and therefore I feel obligated to discuss it. However, I consider it the                
least plausible form of multiculturalism offered out of the three versions I am covering in this                
thesis because of its reliance on an idea Taylor calls “social goods”, which I will argue simply can                  
not exist. I am therefore devoting time immediately after discussing his theory to critique it               
specifically. My discussion of Taylor is therefore significantly more self-contained than my            
discussions of Young and Kymlicka, who will reappear throughout the third and fourth sections. 
 
Charles Taylor: “The Politics of Recognition” 
 
Taylor begins his essay with two empirical claims about the nature of identity. The first is                
his thesis of recognition, and the second is his dialogical claim about identity formation. The               
thesis of recognition underpins his entire essay, stating that, “our identity is partly shaped by               
recognition or its absence, often by misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people                 
can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them                 
a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves.” This idea has strong             
19
empirical backing, as psychological studies have demonstrated how even the most independent            
people’s sense of self-worth is always dependent on what other people’s perception of them is.               
20
Taylor then advocates for a “dialogical” view of human identity, “We become full human agents,               
capable of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining our identity, through our acquisition             
19 Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition” in ​Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition​. 
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 1994), 25 
20 For a particularly strong display of this: see Jonathan Haidt’s discussion of the way other people’s 
opinions affect us in ​The Righteous Mind​, 77-78. 
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of rich human languages of expression.” Note that Taylor views the dialogical function of              
21
identity formation as a continual process. It is not merely at the “genesis” of identity formation,                
such as during childhood or when we first acquire language skills; dialogical feedback is a               
perpetually necessary condition for one’s identity to exist, “If some of the things I value most are                 
accessible to me only in relation to the person I love, then that person becomes a part of my                   
identity.”   
22
From these two claims, Taylor then contrasts liberalism’s universalist view of citizenship            
with the view he advocates for: the politics of difference, “what is established [by liberalism] is                
meant to be universally the same, and identical basket of rights and immunities; with the               
politics of difference, what we are asked to recognize is the unique identity of this individual or                 
group, their distinctness from everyone else.” Every person needs an identity and each person’s              
23
identity is attached to particular cultural and linguistic contexts, and so the politics of              
recognition seeks to acknowledge the universal nature of identity, but that universality manifests             
as a particular set of needs and desires for differing cultural groups. When coupled with his prior                 
two empirical claims, the logic entails that to ignore the distinct identities of groups is to deny                 
those people’s existence in a meaningful sense. If I am of a cultural heritage outside the                
dominant majority culture, and I identify with that group, then for the state to refuse to                
acknowledge my group’s unique needs and desires is to deny that group’s existence in the               
harmful way he spells out with the thesis of recognition. Because different cultural groups have               
such varying demands and needs, and racial groups have such disparate experiences in society,              
the state will have to treat different groups with a flexibility that liberalism’s universal rights               
cannot allow for. The argument follows that, “we make these [cultural, linguistic, etc.]             
21 “The Politics of Recognition”, 32 
22 Ibid, 34 
23 Ibid, 38 
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distinctions the basis for differential treatment. So members of aboriginal bands will get certain              
rights and powers not enjoyed by other Canadians if the demands for native self-government are               
finally agreed on, and certain minorities will get the right to exclude others in order to preserve                 
their cultural integrity.” What the distinction of group needs entails is that the state must               
24
provide collective or group rights beyond the traditional liberal individual rights. When the state              
does so, these collective groups become bearers of rights in addition to individuals. The example               
Taylor provides is that of the French Canadian government’s policy of “survival”, in which they               
attempt to avoid the larger English Canadian culture and language from taking over their own.               
Here, the politics of recognition diverges starkly from the picture of liberalism I provided in the                
first section. The survival of French culture is not merely a convenient result of individual               
actions, but a good that is pursued by a collective body of French speakers. The most illustrative                 
comment is this: 
It is not just a matter of having the French language available for those who might                
choose it. But it also involves making sure that there is a community of people here in the                  
future that will want to avail itself of the opportunity to use the French language. Politics                
aimed at survival actively seek to ​create members of the community, for instance, in              
their assuring that future generations continue to identify as French-speakers.  
25
 
Here Taylor exemplifies his theory of social goods. It is easy to confuse social goods with public                 
goods, but they hold a critical difference. While enjoyed by every individual within a polity, and                
thereby acquiring a certain collective status, public goods are always things whose goodness is              
contingent upon the enjoyment of individuals in the public domain. For instance, clean water is               
only a good because it allows the individual people with a society to drink water without risk of                  
contamination or illness. Social goods are beneficial for a society as an entity of its own, i.e. they                  
are irreducible to the preferences and desires of the individuals in a polity. In a later essay,                 
“Irreducible Social Goods,” Taylor argues for the existence of social goods by saying that culture 
24 Ibid, 39-40 
25 Ibid, 58-59 
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Is not a mere instrument of the individual goods. It can’t be distinguished from them as                
their merely contingent condition, … It [culture] is essentially linked to what we have              
identified as good. … to say that a certain kind of self-giving heroism is good, or a certain                  
quality of aesthetic experience, must be to judge the cultures in which this kind of               
heroism and that kind of experience are conceivable options as good cultures. If such              
virtue and experience are worth cultivating, then the cultures have to be worth fostering,              
not as contingent instruments, but for themselves.  
26
 
On this theory, the French language is a social good because it is the essential ingredient to                 
French Canadian culture writ large. It is necessary for the survival and continuation of French               
Canadian society itself that the French language is continued, so the French Language becomes              
a social good for Quebecois society, a good irreducible to the individuals within Quebecois              
society. If the French speakers in Quebec province find the French language good, then they               
have a vested interest in ensuring the French language continues to exist for the future of that                 
society, and for that society’s own sake. 
The form of liberalism I endorsed cannot account for social goods, and therefore the              
conceptualization of difference that Taylor has, “it [substantial liberalism] can’t accomodate           
what the members of distinct societies really aspire to, which is survival. This is (b) a collective                 
goal, which (a) almost inevitably will call for some variations in the kinds of law we deem                 
permissible from one cultural context to another.” Once social goods are considered part of a               
27
society, they pose an irreconcilable problem for the liberal looking to achieve universal rights,              
for liberal rights are, contrary to Rawls’ and Dworkin’s aspirations, not an Archimedean point of               
view, but rather very much a doctrine derived from the western philosophical tradition. Taylor              
28
points to controversies like Salman Rushdie’s fatwa as an example of how the separation of               
church and state, either in the American context, or as the French laicite, is a distinctly western                 
26 Charles Taylor, “Irreducibly Social Goods” in ​Philosophical Arguments​ (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1995), 142. 
27 “The Politics of Recognition”, 61 
28 Philip Pettit makes this argument about the original position in a 1974 article entitled “A Theory of 
Justice?”.  
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construct. Liberalism is thus a “fighting creed” and cannot claim cultural neutrality. The point              
being that the idea of liberal universalism is itself a suspect idea, and so given its lack of true                   
universality, there is no excuse for it to be able to crowd out other cultural views, however                 
divergent. Taylor does acknowledge the potential room for minority groups to abuse the             
tolerance this views affords them in the sense that the group could commit acts western society                
finds abhorrent, but he does not offer any solution to this problem, ending the discussion with                
the claim that, “the challenge is to deal with their sense of marginalization without              
compromising our basic political principles.”  
29
Taylor’s vision of multiculturalism has a second dimension. For Taylor, the issue is not              
just that a group’s existence is acknowledged, but that the group’s worth is acknowledged by               
society writ large. He offers several methods to foster a groups’ sense of worth. The first is to                  
adopt Franz Fanon’s view of purging oppressive and demeaning views of previously subjugated             
minority, though Taylor thinks this is best done via education specific to a group’s cultural past                
rather than through violent overthrow of oppressors. The careful thing to note is that this is                
strictly a rehabilitative project for Taylor: 
The reason for these proposed changes is not, or not mainly, that all students may be                
missing something important through the exclusion of a certain gender or certain races             
or cultures, but rather that women and students from excluded groups are given, either              
directly or by omission, a demeaning picture of themselves, as though all creativity and              
worth inhered in males of European provenance.   
30
 
And so, for groups who have experienced a demeaning view of themselves, the only way to                
recognize their own worth is through programs that specifically teach the successes of their              
cultural groups. This is only the first step, however. The second comes as what he calls a                 
“presumption” about cultural worth that he thinks should predicate any intergroup interaction..            
The presumption is that, “all human cultures that have animated whole societies over some              
29 “The Politics of Recognition”, 63 
30 Ibid, 65 
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considerable stretch of time have something important to say to all human beings.” The result               
31
for Taylor is achieving Gadamer’s fusion of horizons, in which the various cultural groups within               
a polity all have their senses of self-worth and new vocabularies to compare and contrast               
cultural groups are created to better incorporate their differences into a coherent, single political              
framework. 
Before moving on to discussing Iris Marion Young’s account of multiculturalism, I want             
to further discuss Taylor’s theory of social goods and argue must it be false. Recall that his                 
argument for culture as a social good makes the claim that culture “is essentially linked to what                 
we have identified as good.” The problem with his argument is that the use of “we” in that                  
sentence is unidentifiable. To illustrate this, imagine we are watching the 1953 Japanese film              
“Tokyo Story” and we see that the daughter-in-law, Noriko, cares for her parents-in-law while              
the rest of the aging parents’ children ignore them, even though the expectation in Japan at that                 
time was that birth children would care for their parents. We admire Noriko’s selfless behavior.               
If our acknowledgment of Noriko’s behavior counts as seeing her actions as “good” in any               
normative sense, which I think it clearly does, then the “we” in Taylor’s claim can apply to                 
people outside of the given culture. But if that’s the case, then as Appiah points out, “Taylor                 
seems to be just wrong: one can recognize something as a good embedded in a certain culture                 
without remotely mourning this culture’s passing.” I certainly don’t actively mourn the passing             
32
of post-war Japanese culture even as I admire Noriko’s actions, and even more firmly, I do not                 
think any government would have had an obligation to preserve that culture so that people could                
socialize themselves in such an environment. So claiming that the “we” relates to people outside               
the culture is false. Confining the “we” to only those inside the culture offers no avail to Taylor                  
either, “the fact that one values what one values isn’t an argument for anything, let alone for                 
31 Ibid, 66 
32 ​Ethics of Identity​, 129 
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“fostering” some culture or other. Any form of life would be self-validating in that sense.” Since                
33
those two uses of “we” exhausts the possible list of cultural contexts it could exist within,                
Taylor’s argument for irreducible social goods is thus either false -- people can appreciate a               
cultural quality without needing to actively foster that culture -- or assuming the point he wants                
to prove.  
Let us say the argument I just provided fails. Even if this were the case, social goods are                  
still deeply implausible. Being a “good” that the state has an obligation to provide or maintain                
means that there is some benefit or reason for maintaining it. If that is true then social goods                  
face the insuperable hurdle of determining who or what is benefitting from that good. The most                
intuitive answer is the citizens of that society, but such an answer devolves social goods into                
public goods, which while communal in effect, are justified based upon the benefits the specific               
citizens receive. If the citizens are not benefitting from a ‘good’ of some kind, then it is genuinely                  
mysterious what entity is benefitting from the good preserved why that entity matters. But for               
the sake of argument, we can imagine that defenders of social goods can provide a plausible                
entity receiving that good, there is still an additional question facing it, and that is answering                
what moral status that entity with the social good has. Because social goods are good for that                 
amorphous entity rather than reducible to the needs and wants of the citizens, there is a                
confounding question of how to adjudicate conflicts between citizens and the ‘thing’ that is the               
basis for that social good. If the majority of citizens want to do something, say, learn English in                  
primary school in Montreal and Quebec, but that decision is bad for the social entity that is the                  
basis of French language as a social good, then who wins out? Surely the citizens do. But if that                   
is the case, then it seems any time citizens want to do something, the social good would simply                  
lose out, meaning the entity receiving the social good has no real normative power or influence,                
33 Ibid.  
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and if it has none, then I do not see how we can know it exists. What if the countries around the                      
Mediterranean decide they want to reform the Roman Empire -- does the social good within all                
those nations have a moral status that would prohibit them from doing so? This is of course a                  
fantastical example, but that is really my point -- the countries don’t do that because the                
individuals within the country don’t want to, not because there is some spectral non-human              
entity that informs or dictates their decisions. In this case, social goods seem to reduce to public                 
goods. 
Iris Marion Young: ​Justice and the Politics of Difference 
The scope of Young’s book is vast and I will not be able to cover her entire theory. I am                    
instead focusing on two of her five faces of oppression and the multicultural conclusions she               
argues emerges from them -- there are economic concerns she raises that I will not address.                
Young sought nothing less than the entire reorientation of political philosophy as it was              
conducted at the time of ​Justice and the Politics of Difference’s publication in 1990. She rejects                
the common use of ideal theory in western political philosophy (e.g. ​A Theory of Justice and                
Anarchy, State, and Utopia​), by arguing that such idealizations are either too vague to              
meaningfully apply to contemporary and situated political institutions, or really a hidden            
reflection of the given society it was written in while pretending to offer universal values.               
34
Secondly, she rejects what she calls the “distributive paradigm” of justice. This is the emphasis               
theorists since Rawls placed on finding the just distribution of resources and goods within a               
society. For instance, when Rawls argues wealth and income should be distributed according to              
his Difference Principle, he is creating a specific distributive criterion by which wealth and              
income must be distributed, and when that distribution is achieved, justice has occurred. Young              
finds this paradigm of thinking about justice lacking, ​as she argues it “tends to focus thinking                
34 Iris Marion Young, ​Justice and the Politics of Difference​. (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 
1990), 4 
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about social justice on the allocation of material goods such as thing, resources, income, and               
wealth…” while ignoring a broader set of issues like “decision making power and procedures,              
35
division of labor, and culture.” Distributive justice thus can not properly capture issues of              
36
justice like social relations or power imbalances well. There are two problems with applying the               
distributive paradigm to issues like power dynamics: “doing so reifies social relations and             
institutional rules. Something identifiable and assignable much be distributed,” it also, “must            
37
conceptualize all issues of justice in terms of patterns. It implies a static social ontology that                
ignores processes.” Her critique is ironically the same as Robert Nozick’s Wilt Chamberlain             
38
thought experiment, namely that looking strictly at the patterns of distributed goods is not going               
to answer the question of whether justice is realized. She argues that, instead of the               
39
distributive paradigm, theorists should analyze justice through a framework of domination and            
oppression. Taking a cue from Habermas’ communicative ethics, justice becomes in part a             
process in addition to a set of principles, “For a norm to be just, everyone who follows it must in                    
principle have an effective voice in its consideration and be able to agree to it without coercion.                 
For a social condition to be just, it must enable all to meet their needs and exercise their                  
freedom; thus justice requires that all be able to express their needs.” Domination and              
40
oppression relate to her definition of justice insofar as they are restrictions on one’s ability to                
realize the process of justice and develop their capacities. Domination is “institutional constraint             
on self-determination”, thereby depriving people of their chance to input their voice into the              
41
democratic process, and oppression is the “institutional constraint on self-development,”          
42
35 Ibid, 15. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid, 27. 
38 Ibid, 28. 
39 For Nozick’s discussion of “patterned” principles of distribution, see ​Anarchy, State, and Utopia 
(Cornwall UK: Blackwell Publishing. 1974), 155-164.  
40 ​Justice and the Politics of Difference​, 34. 
41 Ibid, 37. 
42 Ibid. 
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thereby preventing people from realizing their capacities. Her domination and oppression           
paradigms are structural concepts, and go beyond the traditional conception of oppression as a              
direct tyranny, which had ruled the philosophical imagination since Hobbes. Oppression occurs            
when institutions place individuals or groups in that position, even if the system is not a                
paradigmatically oppressive regime.  
The cornerstone of Young’s theory is her famous five faces of oppression, which are the               
more specific ways that people experience oppression. They are: exploitation, marginalization,           
powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence. I am not going to delve into the first three               
listed as, “these three categories refer to structural and institutional relations that delimit             
people’s material lives.” Thus, her arguments about them in the rest of the book do not pertain                 
to the issue of cultural difference. Of course, exploitation, domination, and powerlessness            
disproportionately affect minority groups, but those concerns all fit cleanly into a liberal             
egalitarian theory. The remaining two faces, cultural imperialism and violence, perhaps fit less             
obviously in liberal egalitarian theories, and thus I want to further explicate them, because they               
are the two faces of oppression that lead her to believe group-differentiated rights are necessary               
for justice.  
Cultural imperialism is “the universalization of a dominant group’s experience and           
culture, and its establishment as the norm.” Cultural imperialism emerges out of the dominant              
43
group’s control over resources and therefore the cultural production, which means that only, or              
at least predominantly, their ideas and views are expressed in mainstream culture. Young thinks              
that “those living under cultural imperialism find themselves defined from the outside,            
positioned, placed, by a network of dominant meanings they experience as arising from             
elsewhere, from those with whom they do not identify and who do not identify with them.” The                 
44
43 Ibid, 59. 
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identities of those suffering from cultural imperialism are defined by people who do not share               
their experiences, effectively silencing alternative views and interpretations that can emerge           
from minority experiences. Those oppressed by cultural imperialism do not have control over             
the cultural images that depict them within their own society. The result of cultural imperialism               
is double consciousness, “one finds oneself defined by two cultures: a dominant and a              
subordinate culture… while the subject desires recognition as human, capable of activity, full of              
hope and possibility, she receives from the dominant culture only the judgment that she is               
different, marked, or inferior.”  
45
The second face of oppression I want to explore is violence, which manifests as “random,               
unprovoked attacks on their persons or property, which have no motive but to damage.”              
46
Violence is not merely random individual attacks, for then violence would not be a face of                
oppression as almost everyone experiences at least the risk of violence. What makes violence a               
face of oppression is, “the social context surrounding them [acts of violence], which makes them               
possible and even acceptable. … Violence is systemic because it is directed at members of a                
group simply because they are members of that groups.” Note that violence here is defined not                
47
merely as physical attacks, but also emotional degradation and social forms of harm such as               
harassment, intimidation, and stigmatization. The most obvious and characteristic example of           
violence is a hate crime like the Charleston South Carolina shooting. But even more generally,               
Christian Americans simply do not live in the same anxious fear of harassment or violence than                
Muslim Americans do.  
Liberals of all kinds obviously oppose such terrible individual acts of violence, but it is                
not clear to Young that liberals can properly explore or root out the cultural and structural flaws                 
45 Ibid, 60. 
46 Ibid, 61. 
47 Ibid, 61-2. 
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that provide the foundation for both cultural imperialism and violence, especially of a             
non-physical kind. The result is that so long as we remain in the liberal paradigm of universality                 
and individuality, we will never really liberate minority groups who need large, structural             
changes and a provided space within the cultural and political framework to celebrate and              
express their identities.  
Young begins her case for multiculturalism by rejecting the paradigm of assimilation,            
which she conceives as, “equal social status for all persons requires treating everyone according              
to the same principles, rules, and standards.” She then contrasts this with the overarching              
48
ethos of the politics of difference, “equality as the participation and inclusion of all groups               
sometimes requires different treatment for oppressed or disadvantaged groups.”  
49
Young has three arguments against the assimilationist ethic: first, assimilation forces           
minority groups to adjust to the social rules and settings of another group. The implication of                
such a demand is that minority groups are always, “coming into the game after it is already                 
begun, after the rules and standards have been set.” Thus, the dominant groups are implicitly               
50
setting the rules for all to follow, and in doing so are severely disadvantaging minority groups                
from succeeding because naturally the dominant group will select rules that are best for them,               
unable to fully consider how those rules will affect others. Second, the assimilationist ethic              
perpetuates cultural imperialism, “by allowing norms expressing the point of view and            
experience of privileged groups to appear neutral and universal.” The result is that dominant              
51
groups continue to enjoy the illusion of their universality, while depriving minority groups of the               
same privilege. Lastly, because of the continued assumption that the dominant group is some              
48 Ibid, 158. 
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid, 164. 
51 Ibid, 165. 
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neutral standard by which others must conform, participating in mainstream institutions,           
“means to accept and adopt an identity one is not.”   
52
Even if the universalist adopts a “transformational” view, saying we must reform current             
standards to truly offer a more neutral institutional structure, Young still thinks that the denial               
of differential politics is still unjust. For Young the reasoning of difference is the realization of                
self-crafting one’s one image and liberating the self: 
A politics that asserts the positivity of group differences is liberating and empowering. In              
the act of reclaiming the identity the dominant culture has taught them to despise, and               
affirming it as an identity to celebrate, the oppressed remove double consciousness. …             
Not longer does one have the impossible project of trying to become something one is               
not under circumstances where the very trying reminds one of who one is. This politics               
[of difference] asserts that oppressed groups have distinct cultures, experiences, and           
perspectives on social life with humanly positive meaning…  
53
 
Differential institutions are necessary to create the space that minority groups need to reimagine              
themselves and recraft their self-image without the constraints of cultural imperialism. Free to             
pursue political and cultural projects without the constant pressure of conforming to dominant             
groups, oppressed groups can escape double consciousness. The goal of her politics of difference              
is to create a heterogeneous political sphere and cultural industry, where groups can seize the               
formation of their own image. This requires not just the view of things like race and gender as                  
normatively neutral ideas like how we treat eye-color, but the active belief in difference as a good                 
thing that justice demands be cultivated, not just by individuals within those groups, but by the                
state as well. In her “heterogeneous public”, acknowledgment of group difference and            
group-conscious public policy is not merely a means to social equality, “but also as intrinsic to                
the ideal of social equality itself. Groups cannot be socially equal unless their specific experience,               
culture, and social contributions are publicly affirmed and recognized.” She therefore           
54
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reconceives of the idea of “difference” itself, in which difference is no longer defined or               
conceived as “deviant” or “other” in the objectifying sense, but rather difference comes to mean               
“specificity” or “variation”.  
Most historical discriminations have been wrong not because they distinguished people           
according to group attributes, but because they aimed at or resulted in formally and              
explicitly restricting the actions and opportunities of group members. They have been            
wrong, that is, because they have contributed to and helped enforce oppression. If             
discrimination serves the purpose of undermining the oppression of a group, it may be              
not only permitted, but morally required.  
55
 
The final result for her theory is that a just society both addresses the economic and material                 
oppressions, but also creates a kaleidoscopic public sphere in which different groups exist within              
their own space as discrete social entities, but still interacting on terms of equality. One of the                 
most important ways to do that is to carve out space in representative politics for these groups.  
She therefore advocates for a legislative process that meets the following three criteria: 
 
(1) self-organization of group members so that they achieve collective empowerment and            
a reflective understanding of their collective experience and interests in the context of             
the society; (2) group analysis and group generation of policy proposals in their             
institutionalized contexts where decisionmakers are obliged to show that their          
deliberations have taken group perspectives into consideration; and (3) group veto           
power regarding specific policies that affect a group directly, such as reproductive rights             
for women, or land use policy for Indian reservations.  
56
 
Thus, in the just society Young aspires for, differences between groups are factored into the               
democratic process, which allow the different groups to legislate the issues that matter most              
deeply to them, and to have the collective legislative power to ensure that their interests are not                 
ignored or overridden in the democratic process. 
Will Kymlicka: ​Multicultural Citizenship 
The last theorist I will examine is Will Kymlicka, whose ​Multicultural Citizenship​, offers             
one of the most interesting and original theories of multicultural rights, as the justifications for               
55 Ibid, 197. 
56 Ibid, 184. 
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establishing these rights is predicated entirely on three liberal egalitarian principles I espoused             
in the first section. He does this by arguing that when the principles of a free and equal society                   
are applied with an acknowledge of the way cultural and racial differences have disadvantaged              
minority groups, then the need to redress them manifests as “universal rights, assigned to              
individuals regardless of group membership, and certain group-differentiated rights or ‘special           
status’ for minority cultures.” Kymlicka’s use of “culture” differs slightly from Taylor and             
57
Young’s usages. For him there are distinctions to make between ethnic minorities, “immigrants             
who have left their national community to enter another society,” (American blacks are the              
58
major exception to the immigrant stipulation) national minorities, “distinct and potentially           
self-governing societies incorporated into a larger society,” and new social movements like            
59
radical feminism, the disabled, and sexual minorities. Kymlicka wants to focus on justifying             
multicultural rights for the first two groups.  
One of the most important ways that Kymlicka liberalizes his theory of multiculturalism             
is by making a distinction between what he calls “external protections” and “internal             
restrictions”. The former is “intended to protect the group from the impact of external decisions               
(e.g. the economic or political decisions of the larger society).”, while the latter is “intended to                
60
protect the group from destabilizing impact of internal dissent (e.g. the decision of individual              
members not to follow traditional practices or customs…”. This distinction is critical to a liberal               
61
theory of multiculturalism because Kymlicka believes liberal states can only allow for external             
protections, “in so far as they promote equality between groups, by rectifying disadvantages or              
vulnerabilities suffered by the members of a particular group. In short, a liberal view requires               
57 Will Kymlicka, ​Multiculturalism Citizenship​. (Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 1995), 6 
58 Ibid, 19. 
59 Ibid.  
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freedom within the minority group, and equality between the minority and majority groups.”             
62
One objection someone might raise is that his distinction between external protections and             
internal restrictions breaks down quickly and often. He admits to this problem and solves the               
dilemma by arguing that a liberal society must reject any external protection if it also leads to                 
internal restrictions, “In some cases, measures to protect cultural membership may be            
unnecessary, or come at too high a price in terms of other liberal goals. If measures to protect                  
minority cultures are unnecessary or too costly, then a policy of ‘benign neglect’ may be justified                
in certain circumstance.” He revises this slightly in chapter 8 by saying that internal              
63
restrictions are justifiable for national, but not ethnic minorities, because imposing liberal            
values on national minorities is as inefficacious and unfair as imposing them on foreign              
countries.  
64
Kymlicka provides three arguments for why liberals should adopt a framework of            
multicultural rights in the sixth chapter. I will only be looking at one, the equality argument. It is                  
by far the strongest argument I think any multicultural theory has offered for             
group-differentiated rights, and the one most original to his theory. 
The equality argument is a direct refutation of the common liberal argument that, “If a               
culture is worth saving… the members of the culture will sustain it through their own choices. If                 
the culture is decaying, it must be because some people no longer find it worthy of their                 
allegiance.” This view is often known as ‘benign neglect’, because it seeks to treat cultural               
65
membership as a negative right, neither actively fostering nor dissuading people from            
participating for belonging to any group, just like how the state treats any religious organization.               
62 Ibid, 152.  
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Defenders of benign neglect often make a comparison between the state’s neutrality on religion,              
saying we can treat cultures just the same. Kymlicka calls this view incoherent.  
Government decisions on languages, internal boundaries, public holidays, and state          
symbols unavoidably involve recognizing, accommodating, and supporting the needs and          
identities of particular ethnic and national groups. The state unavoidably promotes           
certain cultural identities, and thereby disadvantages others. … The state cannot help but             
give at least partial establishment to a culture when it decides which language is to be                
used in public schooling, or in the provision of state services. The state can (and should)                
replace religious oaths in courts with secular oaths, but it cannot replace the use of               
English in courts with no language.   
66
 
For Kymlicka the inevitability of these state endorsements means that liberals must shift the              
question debate from one of how to achieve the most neutral outcomes to one of “what is a fair                   
way to recognize languages, draw boundaries, and distribute powers?” The answer, he argues,             
67
is that “we should aim at ensuring that all national groups have the opportunity to maintain                
themselves as a distinct culture, if they so choose.” Thus Kymlicka is endorsing a form of                
68
non-distributive luck egalitarianism as the basis for his equality argument. He thinks            
multicultural external protections, “such as territorial autonomy, veto powers, guaranteed          
representation in central institutions, land claims, and language rights,” is the best way to              
69
eliminate unfair inequalities by better insulating minority cultural groups from the whims and             
demands of dominant groups. The equality argument is not a carte blanche argument for any               
kind of multicultural policy however. It both precludes internal restrictions, as well as defending              
multicultural rights only, “if there is an actual disadvantage with respect to cultural             
membership, and if the rights actually serve to rectify the disadvantage.” What Kymlicka is              
70
looking to do here is turn liberal neutrality from a theory of results (i.e. attempting to have the                  
66 Ibid, 108 … 111. 
67 Ibid, 113.  
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid, 109.  
70 Ibid, 109-110. 
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state be neutral between results of human action) into a theory of justification, in which the state                 
would instead offer neutral rationales for acting. 
I will return to the equality argument in the fourth section, but for now, I will say that I                   
consider it the single strongest argument for multiculturalism, and that substantial liberalism            
will not offer a completely satisfying response to it. That said, substantial liberalism is not as                
inept on this issue as Kymlicka portrays it to be. 
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Section 3: Rejecting Permanent Group Rights 
I will now turn to the objections I will lodge against multicultural theory. Before I begin, 
I first want to note an implication latent within​ multicultural theory that matters a great deal for 
this section. Multiculturalism assumes that every person has a positive right to culture. By 
positive right to culture, I am referring to a state’s theoretical obligation to preserve, foster, and 
maintain the cultural groups that each theorist deems worthy. This positive right to culture is in 
opposition to liberalism’s claim that culture is only a negative right, that is, the government of 
course cannot actively attempt to remove cultures from existence, but that the state has no 
obligation to help a culture continue its existence through non-universal rights. As we shall see, 
this distinction makes a tremendous difference. The objections I lodge in this section are, ​in 
order,  “The Division Problem”, “Multiculturalism is not Liberating”, “No De Re Obligation”, and 
“The Deflation Argument”.  
 
The Division Problem​: Having a positive liberty to permanent group-specific rights runs into             
a constant challenge I will refer to as the division problem, which occurs whenever a government                
attempts to decide which groups will receive group-specific rights. The division problem            
manifests in two ways. The first problem is that it is impossible to non-arbitrarily decide which                
groups within a polyethnic, multinational nation will receive multicultural protections. This is            
because there is an enormous diversity of views and beliefs within any given group. There could                
be sharp divisions with a single group which are difficult to capture or know about unless one                 
were in that group. We must remember that governments are not omniscient entities perfectly              
responsive to the needs and demands of its citizens, particularly a small subsect of them. There                
is a very real risk that the government will accidentally pick a “winner” in some debate within a                  
group by providing protections and rights based upon that subsect’s desires and beliefs. 
Ironically, attempting to solve that dilemma just runs into an even deeper division             
problem. Namely, it is impossible to divide groups in ways that will not also exclude the                
legitimate preferences of members of that group, which could then entitle the subdivision of that               
group to their own set of group rights. For example, let us imagine that anti-semitic sentiments                
reach such a degree that the government, sympathetic with multiculturalism, seeks to establish             
laws and rights unique to the Jewish community. The first obvious question is what conception               
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of Judaism are the rights predicated upon; Orthodox Jews might as well be another religion in                
their cultural customs and attitudes compared to liberal sects of Reformists, and yet they both               
suffer from the same antisemitism. Let us say the United States, sensitive to the concern I just                 
raised, then splits up Jewish rights into two subdivisions: Orthodox protections and Reformist             
protections. The problem of course is that even within those two factions, there is legitimate and                
substantive disagreement that should then entitle each sect of the subset of Judaism to their               
own group specific needs. Of course there is variety within those sects as well, which might well                 
entitle subsects of the subsects a legitimate entitlement to certain group rights. Repeat this              
process enough, and you will arrive back at individual rights.  
Young dismisses this objection as one that all political philosophy faces, but she is              
71
wrong. It is a unique problem for multiculturalism because the theory demands that groups be               
specially represented in politics or receive protections of some kind. It is only when institutions               
move beyond concern for individuals that this problem occurs. Kymlicka argues that the division              
problem is not a uniquely formidable problem for multiculturalism because, “the problem of             
identifying disadvantaged groups is not unique to issues of political representation, and it may              
not be avoidable in a country committed to redressing injustice.” This seems only partially              
72
true. As I will argue in the fourth section, Tommie Shelby’s theory of pragmatic solidarity gives                
substantial liberalism reason good reason to think that it can properly redress injustice without              
suffering from a division problem, at the very least one as acute as multiculturalism suffers.  
The multicultural theorist does have on potentially satisfying reply to this objection,            
namely, that while it is true that multicultural policies would not perfectly delineate all the               
factions within a minority group, it is still true that this policy would improve attention given to                 
these groups within politics. Much as a country must make arbitrary delineations between             
71 ​Justice and the Politics of Difference​, 190.  
72 ​Multicultural Citizenship​, 146.  
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citizens eligible and ineligible for social security, or of those eligible for disability benefits, the               
state could make similar distinctions for minority cultural groups. Such a reply is a Pyrrhic               
victory for multiculturalism, for the rejoinder reveals the way that multiculturalism inevitably            
makes claims about who counts as a “true” or “authentic” member of a given minority group.                
The reason is simple: if the state makes protections for a group, then the interests and demands                 
of that group are subsumed into the current power structure within that group. This leads to my                 
second criticism. 
Multiculturalism is not Liberating​: One of the major arguments all three theorists provide             
for multicultural rights is that the ability to form codified communities outside the straight,              
white, male centered institutions of western society is that they provide a means of liberation for                
the minority groups. Thus, multiculturalism is often predicated on the believe that group             
differentiated rights will provide a form of liberation for oppressed groups. For instance, Young              
claims that the “assertion of a positive sense of group difference by these groups is emancipatory                
because it reclaims the definition of the group by the group, as a creation and construction,                
rather than a given essence.” However we should be highly skeptical of multicultural optimism              
73
on this topic. The first reason is because of what Kwame Anthony Appiah calls “collective               
scripts” (and later the “Medusa Syndrome”). In speaking of a collective identity to protect or               
preserve, institutions are necessarily going to make a claim about what the authentic identity              
being preserved looks like, “The large collective identities that calls for recognition come with              
notions of how a proper person of that kind behaves: it is not that there is one way that gays or                     
blacks should behave, but there are gay and black modes of behavior”. This claim might seem                
74
too strong, but the existence of these “modes of behavior” is the best explanation for what                
73 ​The Politics of Difference​, 172 
74 Kwame Anthony Appiah ,”Identity, Authenticity, Survival”, in ​Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of 
Respect​. (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 1994), 159 
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multiculturalism is accomplishing. If there is no authentic way of being black or of being gay,                
what is worth preserving or protecting? These are inherently confining expectations for            
behavior; these are the scripts. They come at a cost that is ignored by the multicultural                
literature. 
Demanding respect for people as blacks and gays requires that there are some scripts              
that go with being an African-American or having same-sex desires. There will be proper              
ways of being black and gay, there will be expectations to be met, demands will be made.                 
It is at this point that someone who takes autonomy seriously will ask whether we have                
not replaced one kind of tyranny with another.  
75
 
What Appiah is highlighting are two critical, but unattractive, features of a multicultural policy.              
The first is that permanent group rights permanently turn features of people into political              
features, i.e. being part of X minority group automatically turns the features of that group being                
preserved, or used as the basis for multicultural protections, into qualities open for political              
discussion and involvement. This is an enormous burden on the individuals who the policies are               
supposed to help and “emancipate”. While politicizing features of people which are politicized by              
the dominant institutions might be a useful or even necessary strategy in contemporary society              
for political equality, there are surely members of minority groups who do not envision a just                
society where their physiological features are politically laden attributes forever.  
Appiah’s second insight is that politicizing a feature of a group will necessarily             
essentialize that quality. To be black and so to be worthy of multicultural protections for being                
black necessitates that the person meet a set of criteria for what it is to be black. Young tries to                    
avoid this conclusion by stating that, “membership in a social group is a function not of                
satisfying some objective criteria, but of a subjective affirmation of affinity with that group, the               
affirmation of that affinity by other members of the group, and the attribution of membership in                
that group by persons identifying with other groups,” but as both Appiah and Tommie Shelby               
76
75 ”Identity, Authenticity, Survival”, 162-163 
76 ​Justice and the Politics of Difference​, 172. 
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have insisted, that is still making essentializing claims about who belongs to X group, it just lets                 
the group in question determine the essentialized features. Such a fate is better than if the                
dominant group is imposing their own standards of group membership, but her standard is              
hardly the “emancipatory” politics Young envisions it to be. Her proposal is still a form of                
cultural essentialist gatekeeping for who is allowed to qualify as a member of X group. As we                 
shall see in the fourth section, liberalism can also account for collective political solidarity, and               
without making essentializing claims about what it means to be X group. There is a critical                
difference between acknowledging that cultural norms and institutions currently do treat people            
as ‘others’ and thinking that this ‘otherness’ is a feature worth continuing; multiculturalism             
subscribes to both these beliefs, liberalism only the former. 
Young would reply here that I am conceiving of ‘otherness’ in the traditional way of “bad”                
or “deviant”, but that we can instead conceptualize “other” as merely different. This reply              
77
ignores critical sociological and psychological facts of how people form identities and view             
“other” groups. Namely, that any attempt to cast others as “different” will certainly come with a                
stigmatized perception of that ‘other’. Viewing a group as mere variation, when turned into a               
politically acknowledged and codified difference, is highly unlikely. Robert Putnam’s paper, “E            
Pluribus Unum” explicitly states this: social trust and social capital decrease as diversity             
increases or is accentuated. There is also the famous “Robbers Cave Experiment” run by              
78
Muzafar Sherif to consider. The experimenters took twenty-two boys who had never met before              
and arbitrarily split them up into two groups. These groups quickly coalesced with their own               
cultures and expectations, and even more notably, when introduced to each other, immediately             
77 Ibid, 171. 
78 ​Robert Putnam,. "​E Pluribus Unum​: Diversity and community in the twenty-first century". ​Scandinavian 
Political Studies​. 30 (2): 137–174.  
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came into conflict that turned so violent that the experimenters had to intervene. The two               
groups of boys only came together when a larger threat was introduced by the experimenters.   
79
There are two notable takeaways from Putnam’s paper and the Robbers Cave            
Experiment for our purposes. The first is that the division into groups developed into sets of                
expectations for how one was supposed to act within those groups (one group of the boys made a                  
virtue of intelligence, the other of toughness). These are the scripts Appiah warns will come with                
the increased divisions of multiculturalism. While they will occur somewhat in any cultural             
context because of culture setting the bounds for our actions, multiculturalism exacerbates those             
confines dramatically by reifing and regulating the actions of all the various groups within a               
multicultural state. The Robbers Cave Experiment corroborates Putnam’s work; when          
differences are accentuated, the result is far more intergroup conflict than when similarities are              
highlighted. The idea that we can create difference without any negative normative            
supervenience onto those groups is untenable. Difference is going to cause othering, which is              
going to lead to friction and distrust. There seems to be an legitimate ought-implies-can              
limitation here that Young is not accounting for. I am not claiming that we should coalesce into                 
communitarian hiveminds even if that would maximize social capital, but rather am highlighting             
the ways codifying difference is the exact opposite approach the state should take when aspiring               
to create a polity of equals, especially when the challenge is that there are groups within that                 
polity who are treated as different and therefore unequal.  
There is a second way that multiculturalism is not a liberating politics. The imposition of               
unjust norms does not solely come from outside groups but from within groups as well. A                
nuanced point to take away from Susan Okin’s essay, “Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?” is               
that multiculturalism is not a panacea of equality. In fact, it can institutionalize and codify               
79 For two discussions of this experiment, see ​The Righteous Mind​, 138-139 and ​The Ethics of Identity​, 
62-64. 
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hierarchies or practices that if protected by the western dominant-group institutions, would            
rightly receive accusations of sexism and other forms of discrimination. Anne Phillips makes             
makes this point all the more explicit in her discussion of the issue: 
There is a large and growing body of feminist writing exploring the damage that can be                
done to women in minority groups when the societies they live in adopt             
multiculturalism, the main contention being that multicultural politics shore up the           
power base of the older men within the community and encourage the public authorities              
to tolerate practices that undermine women’s equality. … groups can oppress their own             
internal minorities -- which might be women, but also be children, homosexuals, or the              
poor… policies of multiculturalism will reinforce the inequalities of power.”  
80
 
This reality seemed to have blindsided the more ardent multicultural advocates, but it should              
have surprised no one. Patriarchal societies, when reified through law, will maintain their             
patriarchal standards. This is true of western and non-western societies equally. But because             
multiculturalism fragments a society and puts certain institutions and cultural practices out of             
reach of the central state in some ways, one of the best means of enforcing equality -- legislation                  
like Title IX in the United States -- is lost. Multiculturalism exacerbates the gender or sex                
inequality because of how it subdivides each of the patriarchal societies within a polity with               
discrete laws that make it all the more difficult to legally enforce discrimination laws. If               
members of that group’s LGBTQ+ are persecuted by a religious minority, and that religious              
minority is given rights separate from those of the country, this becomes its own nightmare to                
prosecute or even enforce the country’s legal protections.  
The prior two arguments are good reasons to think that multiculturalism will not deliver on its                
promise of helping minority groups achieve status as free and equal people. I think for those                
reasons alone, we should abandon multicultural theory. However, I consider these mere            
instrumental failures of multiculturalism. What I am even more opposed to are the conceptual              
failures of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism simply offers a untenable view of culture and its             
relation to normative obligations of the state, as well as misunderstanding what the importance              
of culture is. Remember throughout this discussion that I am specifically referring the what              
obligations the state has towards culture, not what individuals might feel about their culture. 
80 Anne Phillips, ​Multiculturalism without Culture​. (Princeton University Press. 2007, Princeton NJ): 12. 
She cites this survey of the literature on this topic: Avigail Eisenberg and Jeff Spinner-Halev, eds., 
Minorities within Minorities: Equality, Rights, and Diversity​ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005). 
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No De Re Obligation​: As Taylor, Young, and Kymlicka argued earlier, the basis for group               
rights is that the individuals who comprise a group all gain their their identity, and therefore                
sense of self, from belonging to their cultural or religious groups. However, their claim, while               
true, does not provide an actual basis for the preservationist ethic that they all endorse, much                
less the group protections they want to institute. The reason is that individuals will latch onto                
any culture. Culture is, as John Tomasi wryly noted, like oxygen. To say that the government                
81
must foster a culture because people need culture is to make a trivial claim. Culture is                
unavoidable and a natural byproduct of human interaction. The problem for multiculturalism is             
that even if the argument for culture as the basis of identity formation was perfectly sound, their                 
argument does not prove that specific cultures, languages, etc. are themselves good, only that              
the languages and cultures they want to preserve happen to fulfill that role. But any specific                
language or culture could. Just like how oxygen from anywhere in the world will perform               
cellular respiration, any culture will provide the necessary framework for individuals to form             
their sense of self. We form our identities in relation to whatever culture we happen to grow up                  
in. So what multicultural theorists have shown is that French Canadian Culture is a ​de dicto                
necessary feature of an individual’s identity. But that does not mean that the state now has an                 
obligation to its citizens to specifically preserve French Canadian culture. In order for that to be                
true, French Canadian culture would have to function as a ​de re good for the people who grow                  
up in it, i.e. that there is something specific and unique to the French language that is fulfilling a                   
capacity that no other language or culture could fulfill for the formation of an identity of the                 
individuals born in French Canada. That claim would be clearly false. You could take all the                
children born in French Canada and move them to Russia and they would form their identities                
around the Russian language and culture just as if they had never left French Canada. So all that                  
81 John Tomasi, “Kymlicka, Liberalism, and Respect for Cultural Minorities,” ​Ethics​ 105, no. 3 (1995): 590 
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needs to occur for the proper formation of identities is that there is a culture for someone to                  
grow up in. Any culture will perform that role. We do not have a ​de re obligation to any such                    
culture and therefore have no obligation to preserve a culture for the sake of providing a cultural                 
framework for someone to form their sense of self within. To put this another way, for the                 
government to have a positive moral obligation to provide a good, as multiculturalism believes is               
the case for culture, that specific thing needs to be in some sense irreplaceable.  
Someone might object and say that such a definition would mean the government has no               
obligation to feed people or provide shelter for those without it because “any food will do” or                 
“any roof will do.” This objection fails because food and roofs are not an inevitable and necessary                 
component of human life. There is a constant possibility that someone will not have food or                
shelter. Conversely, culture exists regardless of any action people take. If ten people were              
stranded on a desert island together, a set of norms and customs that provide the basis for                 
culture would emerge. What multiculturalism is claiming is that “this specific culture deserves to              
exist via governmental intervention”, which would be the equivalent of saying that the             
government has an obligation to give someone a specific roof over their head or a specific type of                  
food to eat, and obviously they do not. 
I am not claiming that we can get rid of any culture we please because in 200 years no                   
one would know the difference. That would be an attempted justification for genocide, which is               
an absurd result for any political philosophy. What I am questioning is the notion that people                
have a positive right to the preservation of specific cultural identities. In order for them to have a                  
positive right to a specific culture, that culture would have to uniquely perform a function for the                 
formation of an identity for those individuals. There is no such culture that does accomplishes               
that, and we subsequently should reject any view that implies that such a culture does exist. 
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The immediate reply to claiming that cultures are only ​de dicto good, while they need to                
be ​de re good for a positive right to apply, is that this misses the universality of the cultural                   
preservationist impulse. Will Kymlicka makes this point when he compares foregoing one’s            
native culture to choosing to live on bare subsistence: “Liberals rightly assume that the desire for                
non subsistence resources is so normal… that people cannot reasonably be expected to go              
without such resources, even if a few people voluntarily choose to do so. … we should treat                 
access to one’s culture as something that people can be expected to want…” People want to                
82
preserve their own culture that they grew up in and want their children to also grow up in that                   
tradition. This desire is so consistent and so universal that to deprive groups of that opportunity                
is to in some way go against a basic human desire.  
There are two reasons to reject this response. The first is that Kymlicka’s analogy fails.               
“Subsistence” is a vague term much in the same way that “culture” is. So being guaranteed above                 
subsistence carries no implication about what above subsistence looks like. So if we take his               
analogy as a one-to-one obligation, then an institutional guarantee that people have access to a               
culture carries no implication about what culture institutions must provide. The second reason             
to reject Kymlicka’s analogy is that we should be skeptical of his implicit claim that institutions                
are obligated to guarantee someone above the subsistence level. The reason is that if institutions               
must guarantee people goods above the subsistence level, then that creates a luck-egalitarian             
style dilemma about what goods people are entitled to above the subsistence level. I believe such                
a dilemma is useless for theorizing about justice, and furthermore demands too much of              
institutions. If institutions were obligated to guarantee more than subsistence, institutions           
would have deprived me of something if I do not get the exact goods I want above subsistence. I                   
do not see how anyone could be entitled to such demands of institutions. What institutions more                
82 ​Multicultural Citizenship​, 86. 
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plausibly have is an obligation to prevent anyone from falling under subsistence (with things like               
food stamps or rent assistance), as well as an obligation to provide reasonable and dignified               
means for individuals to get above subsistence (both indirectly, with high quality,            
free/subsidized education, good public transportation, etc. and more directly like assistance           
professionalizing job applications). Non-able-bodied people, i.e. those who are incapable of           
staying above the subsistence line without further institutional assistance, are an exception to             
this general claim. If my hypothesis for what institutions owe people sounds more plausible than               
the implied one Kymlicka offers, then his analogy is unsound for that reason as well. 
Deflation Argument​: Though Taylor and Young treat it as an unexamined given, Will             
Kymlicka acknowledges some of the strange elements of the human obsession with culture,             
especially their own. In particular, how it obfuscates the arbitrary nature of so many different               
practices we perform in daily life: how we dress, what we eat (beyond geographical              
determination), the language we speak, etc. None of these things carry any normative value of               
course -- there is nothing better about English, French, Korean, or Igbo, no normative value to                
western vs. traditional African or eastern clothing, and nothing better about Japanese food             
compared to German. However, Kymlicka, along with Taylor and Young, comes to the wrong              
conclusion about what this arbitrariness indicates. They think that, because of all the             
importance people place in their culture, that justice should then acquiesce to these desires. I               
believe this is deeply mistaken, and that instead this obsequiousness to culture is a critical flaw                
in multiculturalism.  
Multiculturalism’s contention that culture is a positive right places it in a dynamic with              
morality that does not stand up to scrutiny. Namely, as a positive right, culture would have the                 
ability to override some basic moral concerns when the two are in tension. When something               
does not have this ability, it exists merely as a negative right. For instance, having a positive                 
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right to water seems to offer a basis for the government to take steps that might well violate                  
property rights to access clean drinking water, or to restrict people’s liberty if people’s actions               
would deprive people of access to water. Such a right does not exist for culture, and the claim                  
that it does, which again is implicit in having a positive right to something, overextends the                
nature of culture and what role it may play in a normative theory.  
It is deeply tempting to think that there is something good about the society we grew up                 
in, the language we speak, the food we eat, etc. Kymlicka offers a compelling list of potential                 
reasons, beginning with his striking turn of phrase, “familiarity with a culture determines the              
boundaries of the imaginable.” As Kymlicka notes though, this would only generate a negative              
83
right to culture. As for why specific cultures must be preserved, he cites several other arguments,                
starting with Yael Tamir’s in ​Liberal Nationalism​, “When they [citizens] are able to identify              
their culture in the political framework, when the political institutions reflect familiar traditions,             
historical interpretations, and norms of behaviour, individuals come to perceive themselves as            
the creators, at least the carriers, or a valuable set of beliefs.” Benedict Anderson offers another                
84
compelling explanation in his outstanding book, ​Imagined Communities​: 
The century of enlightenment, of rationalist secularism, brought with it its own modern  
darkness. With the ebbing of religious belief, the suffering which belief in part composed              
did not disappear. … What then was required was a secular transformation of fatality              
into continuity, contingency into meaning. … If nation-states are widely conceded to be             
‘new’ and ‘historical,’ the nations to which they give political expression always loom out              
of an immemorial past, and, still more important, glide into a limitless culture. It is the                
magic of nationalism to turn chance into destiny.  
85
 
Anderson’s point here is that the continuity of culture and nation is a form of               
amelioration of the world’s suffering, as people know that even if their own lives are ephemeral                
and meaningless, they can can act with meaning and purpose through living on in the               
83 ​Multicultural Citizenship​, 89. 
84 ​Liberal Nationalism​, 72 
85 Benedict Anderson, ​Imagined Communities​. (Verso Books, London, England, 3rd ed. 2006): 11-12. 
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continuation of a tradition that one has wrapped their sense of self into. This view is at least in                   
part corroborated by recent psychological work by Jonathan Haidt. His analysis of the             
psychological foundations for morality and politics reveals that we are evolved to have a faculty               
that treats tradition as normatively good. Not just that, as ultrasocial creatures, we have a               
86
psychological drive to “defend a shared nest”. And as different groups fought for limited              
87
resources, especially in pre-agrarian and pre-industrial times, a sense of connectedness through            
shared cultural norms was necessary to create the social cohesion needed to fight rival groups. 
The groups that figured out (or stumbled upon) cultural innovations that helped them             
cooperate and cohere in groups larger than the family tended to win those competitions.              
Among the most important such innovations is the human love of using symbolic             
markers to show our group memberships. … groups that built on it [shared cultural              
signifiers] and invented more permanent markers found a way to forge a sense of “we”               
that extended beyond kinship.  
88
 
Thus the tribalism that multiculturalism is a modern and far more benign manifestation of              
seems to be a deeply ingrained intuition in our social psychology. I expound on all of these                 
interrelated theories on the value of culture and tradition to convey that I am more sympathetic                
to all of the overlapping desires multicultural theorists have for wishing to preserve culture than               
I have suggested. I also hope it shows that as I criticize multiculturalism, that I am not endorsing                  
an “atomistic” theory of justice. But we cannot ignore that none of these explanations of the                
value of culture generate any basis for a normative theory of justice to make culture a positive                 
right. For instance, Benedict Anderson also believes nationalism contains three innate           
paradoxes, and notes its, “philosophical poverty and even incoherence,” and Haidt explicitly            
89
states that, “My definition of morality was designed to be a descriptive definition; it cannot               
stand alone as a normative definition.” The point being that despite the appeal of the intuition                
90
86 The Righteous Mind, 149 
87 Ibid, 202. 
88 Ibid, 210.  
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that leads us to thinking culture has the same status as a normative theory of ethics, we must                  
reject this intuition when crafting a theory of justice. Cultural traditions can only ever tell us                
what has been. They are in essence anthropological and sociological. They can never tell us               
about the questions that political philosophy wants to know: what institutions should do, what              
society should look like. Treating cultural traditions and cultural affinity as belonging on the              
same level of influence over institutional design as normative theory just misunderstands the             
relationship between normativity and the present. Cultural traditions are nothing more than the             
patterns of social actions have done in the past, and they will never tell us what those social                  
patterns should look like in the future. There is no more obvious and straightforward gap               
between is and ought than ‘cultural tradition’ and ‘justice’. There is nothing morally good about               
arbitrary features of the world like culture and tradition outside of what it does for people going                 
forward. There is nothing good about the fact I happened to grow up in the United States beyond                  
the morally good things that the United States might have instilled in me for the future -- plenty                  
of other societies could have taught me that no person is inherently more worthy of respect or                 
concern in public policy. Cultures are completely neutral beyond their capacity to achieve a just               
society, otherwise there is no better or worse culture from the normative standpoint, which is               
the one that matters for questions of politics. 
I thus far have refrained from explicitly stating what “ethics” we should concern             
ourselves with and and which receive such vaunted status in our institutions. I will now answer                
that question. The two things that any just society will predicate itself upon are a Millian harm                 
principle (I am leaving the enormous question of what actions specifically count as a “harm”               
open somewhat -- a harm is generally something that deprives someone of their status as a free                 
and equal person in some way), and a respect for the choices people make when refraining from                 
violating the harm principle, ​i.e.​ a roughly Kantian respect for autonomy. 
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These two innovations in western ethics, when followed without the racist norms of              
Kant and Mill’s days, have provided the normative bedrock for the freest societies we have yet                
known. Western nations have generally led the charge on the fronts of gender, sexual, and racial                
equality, and the best explanation for why that has been comes from the west’s adoption of those                 
two principles. It is easy to see how these two principles translate to liberating previously               
oppressed minority groups, as neither women nor members of the LGBTQ+ community harm             
anyone, quite the opposite, and therefore those groups deserve the same status, freedom, and              
respect as dominant groups. The west’s general harm principle and devotion to Kantian             
autonomy have been the bedrocks for liberating minority groups, and multiculturalism seeks to             
undermine that bedrock by placing cultural membership on the same level of priority. Rejecting              
that culture is a positive right, and therefore at the same level of importance as the harm                 
principle and Kantian autonomy, does not mean culture is worthless, but it does prevent              
multiculturalism from getting its theory off the ground 
It is important to note that adopting these two principles does not require adopting              
Utilitarianism or Deontology, nor even the ethos of capitalist liberal democracies -- though             
liberal democracies have often been the best exercisers of those principles. Rather, my claim is               
that any left-of-center movement that wants to challenge the hierarchies that cultural norms             
erect is going to appeal to at least one of these two principles. Without them as the cornerstone                  
of a movement, it is unclear on what moral basis they would challenge the tradition on and                 
believe they have the moral high ground. Every liberation movement must reject the dominant              
norms of its time, and so if cultural preservation and tradition are given the weight multicultural                
theorists want them to have, then the justification for those movements is on far more               
precarious theoretical grounding than if culture and tradition are not normative goods.            
Factoring in cultural norms as a good runs the real risk of turning arguments for liberation ​ad                 
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hoc​, for the liberation movement quickly loses its ability to offer a principled basis for               
determining whether tradition matters over the harm principle in any given political context.             
Without the lexicographical priority of the harm principle and Kantian autonomy over cultural             
considerations, there is always the risk that people weighing those two principles will decide to               
favor their tradition instead of the liberation of an oppressed group. 
One objection to my claim could run along these lines: Although it is true that cultures                
are not good in and of themselves, and that any culture could fulfill Taylor’s dialogical process, it                 
is still a fact that French Canadian culture exists and so for members of French Canada to lose                  
that culture would harm them because it would unmoor those people from their identities,              
therefore people do deserve a positive right to their culture for the harm it would do to those                  
people who lose their culture. Even this attitude goes too far. Let us consider a culture that I                  
would deem “inferior” because it resulted in a deeply unjust society: southern slave culture. I               
acknowledge that southern slave culture is an almost cartoonish example, and I do not think               
either Taylor or Young endorses any view defending this culture, but its lengthy existence fulfills               
Taylor “presumption” and also illustrates just how detached cultural norms are from moral             
considerations. It was not just a passing “fad” the way fascism in the early 20th century could be                  
construed; southern slave culture animated society and survived for hundreds of years, with no              
sign of ending if not for northern military intervention. For any meaningful definition of a               
culture, it qualifies. And so, if we are to buy the argument that cultural identifiers are so                 
important that they are good by their mere existence, then something bad is occurring if a                
culture is lost. Even if it is overall overwhelmingly good that southern slave culture was lost, the                 
view of culture as a positive right entails there is something normatively bad that a culture was                 
lost for its unmooring effect on the people who lost those shared norm, and further that this                 
badness should have been a normative consideration if we were deciding whether or not to               
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oppose or reject southern slave culture. I am not referring to the liberation of enslaved blacks                
when I say something “bad occurred”, obviously the end of southern slave culture was wholly               
positive for them. What I am implying the rejoinder indicates is that for the white slave owners                 
or other non-enslaved people in that culture, for culture to be a good worthy of the same kind of                   
consideration ethics is worthy of, then for those white citizens, their loss of culture was bad for                 
them because they lost something they had a positive right to. I think this is simply false. There                  
is nothing normatively bad about southern slave culture disappearing for anyone.  
I do not meant these considerations to say there is only one set of just laws, but rather                  
that just laws are going to embody essential principles that multiculturalism cannot allow if they               
want to protect and preserve certain minority cultural identity. This is a tension at the               
foundation of Young’s theory, in which she both opposes very specific forms of societal              
organization through her five faces of oppression, but is also accepting of self-segregating             
cultural groups. One could could infer what she has in mind to resolve the ethics/culture tension                
in multiculturalism from her defense of ethnocultural segregation in a later book, ​Democracy             
and Inclusion​: 
As long as members of this group also participate on an equal basis in the process of                 
forging democratic inclusive democratic institutions, and support measures to bring          
equal opportunity and economic development to historically oppressed people, and so           
on, a desire on the part of some of them to retain a sense of group affinity is not morally                    
objectionable in itself.  
91
 
But the problem with this kind of defense for multiculturalism is that it conflates group               
self-selection, which liberalism approves of, with government sanctioned, protected, and          
codified group protection from outside forces, which liberals do not approve of. These two              
policies are wildly different in their demands and implications. In addition to the return of the                
concern about scripts, I do not know what she expects from self-segregating groups other than               
91 Iris Marion Young, ​Democracy and Inclusion​ (Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 2000), 216. 
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divergent moral codes and a sense of othering between different groups, both of which will               
inevitably run afoul of the five faces or the stipulations she places in that passage. Taylor is even                  
worse about the tension between culture and ethics. He simply gives up on the idea that ethics                 
should prioritize over culture, saying that liberalism is a distinctly western idea and therefore              
can’t truly recognize difference in the way needed. His pointing to the fatwa placed on Rushdie is                 
deeply troubling. The best defense he thinks westerners can muster for not killing Rushdie is,               
“This reply [this is how we do things here] must be made in cases like the Rushdie controversy,                  
where “how we do things” covers issues such as the right to life and to freedom of speech.”                  
92
Could any just society emerge out of a theocracy that kills ‘blasphemous’ writers? If the answer                
to that question is yes, then it is difficult to see why it isn’t also mere custom that the United                    
States and western Europe do not burn gay people, red-haired people, left handed people,              
heretics, and others at the stake anymore. This might seem hyperbolic, but if it is appropriate                
under Taylor’s theory that an Islamic theocracy kill a man who wrote a novel “disrespecting”               
their religion, I cannot find any principled line to draw between that and all the abominable                
actions I listed above. Taylor is simply wrong here. It is not mere custom, but a humble                 
recognition of the increasingly weak place non-falsifiable ideas such as religion should have in              
dictating our ethics. We recognize the enormous diversity and irreconcilability of religious            
doctrines, and seeing that they are all non-falsifiable, i.e. that we can’t prove any of them correct,                 
we instead have come to predicate ethics on things we do know: the harm principle being one of                  
the most important. 
In saying that ethical concerns receive a lexicographical priority over cultural concerns,             
and linking those ethical judgmentss with a distinctly western ethics, a defender of             
multiculturalism could reasonably object that I am attempting to paint western societies as             
92 “The Politics of Recognition”, 63.  
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morally good, while depicting non-western societies as distinctly bad. This is the critique that              
Susan Okin received for her essay, “Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?” in which she              
highlighted the tension between respect for culture and a slide into moral relativism that harms               
the progress toward equal status and treatment that women in western societies have made.              
This objection is not unreasonable, for historically western hubris has caused a great deal of               
international suffering, and there are legitimate questions about the fraught relationships           
liberalism has had with the feminist movement during the 19th and early 20th centuries.              
93
Theorists like Azizah Y. Al-Hibri, Homi Bhabha, and Bhikhu Parekh have persuasively argued             
that the exact kind of argument I just made can create a distinctive “othering” between western                
norms and every other non-western group in which the successes of equality in the west are                
celebrated and highlighted while its innumerable failures are dismissed as deviations from an             
otherwise steady march toward equality. Meanwhile, the successes of non-western cultures are            
ignored, while their failures are highlighted and expatiated upon. Additionally, views like the             
one I just espoused can lead to the misconception that westerners are independent and free               
individuals, who are mildly influenced by their culture, while the actions of those within              
minority groups are imagined as causally determined by their norms. In light of these              
considerations, they all argue that we should be far more skeptical of liberalism’s liberating              
potential than Okin and I are, and that a much more democratic dialogue with minority groups                
is needed to truly understand their wants and needs.   
94
I do not think my argument succumbs to their objections for a few reasons. The first is                 
that I am not making an unique judgment about the goodness of western culture. What I am                 
93 Bonnie Honnig notes these tensions in her reply to Okin, “My Culture Made me Do it” in​ Is 
Multiculturalism Bad for Women?​ (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
94 Homi K. Bhabha, “Liberalism’s Sacred Cow” 79-84, Bhikhu Parekh, “A Varied Moral World” 69-75, and 
Azizah Y. Al-Hibri, “Is western Patriarchal Feminism Good for Minority Women?” 41-46, all in ​Is 
Multiculturalism Bad for Women? ​(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
 
 
 
 
  ​                                        Siegmund 53 
really extolling are the use of the harm principle and Kantian ethics as a normative bedrock for                 
any attempt to create a society of free and equal people. My claim is that any culture, western or                   
not, is going to have to use these two principles to liberate minority of groups of any kind. The                   
only alternative I know of is using ​ad hoc principles. Moral inconsistency has rarely stopped               
anyone in the real world from acting, but if we want a coherent theory of justice, then we do not                    
have such a luxury and must therefore rely on those two principles to ground any attempt at                 
equality. Secondly, I do not exculpate western society for the atrocities it has committed across               
centuries, and the oppression it continues to impose, such as through interventionist foreign             
policy. My claim is really that when we have applied the harm principle and Kantian autonomy,                
western societies have achieved the freest societies we have yet known. Most of the resistance to                
many of social movements that the harm principles and Kantian Autonomy were the normative              
bedrock for, ​e.g. the feminist or LGBTQ+ movement, came from members of western societies              
who have rejected these two pillars of morality, instead arguing that homosexuality is a sin, or                
disgraceful to god. I am just as impatient with that distinctly western appeal to cultural norms                
and traditions to resist equality as I am with multiculturalism, for again, both simply              
misunderstand the relation between social custom and normativity. You can apply the harm             
principle and Kantian autonomy to any society, and while I think western individualism is              
particularly conducive to adopting principles of justice like them, any society could endorse             
them within their cultural context. They will have to if they want to deconstruct many of the                 
patriarchal or unjust hierarchies within their own social structures.  
To repeat, I am not exculpating the United States, Canada, or other European countries              
for their atrocities which they have committed, especially against Native Americans and blacks,             
and the harm they continue to exhibit against those groups as well as women and various other                 
racial, ethnic, and sexual minorities. I emphatically believe that we have to demand better from               
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mainstream western society in regard to how we treat minority groups, but I expect and demand                
the same from any other cultural minority under the purview of a western government that               
adopts the harm principle and Kantian autonomy as the basis for the government’s decision              
making. If we want equality for women, we can’t separate minority groups out from western               
institutions and then only hold the western institutions to the demands of those two principles.               
95
It is difficult to see how multiculturalism can hold those groups accountable without subscribing              
to the harm principle and Kantian autonomy as well. That does not deny the central role                
activists within a given minority group are going to play when creating change, but argues that                
the codification of rights that multiculturalism favors is not going to help those activists at all. It                 
will instead allow for dominant members of that society to maintain their power and expel               
dissidents from the group for demanding reforms that will likely lead that group down into the                
realm of adopting the harm principle and Kantian autonomy. We should establish laws and              
institutions that demand every citizen of a country follow them from the beginning. 
I have proposed the harm principle and the good of autonomy as the two pillars of my                 
entire proposal. Aside from Kymlicka, multiculturalism has been silent on how to adjudicate the              
tension the harm principle and Kantian autonomy create with cultural traditions. For Young,             
her domination/oppression paradigm should provide the theoretical grounding, but she makes           
no effort to unpack the inherent tensions that multiculturalism will create between letting             
groups who would seek to enforce various forms of oppression and her rightful conviction that               
oppression is a universal wrong. But the second we take the removal of oppressions as a                
96
universal moral quality, then the entire impetus for group differentiated right dissolves, it just              
95 One might reasonably fear that this would lead to a bellicose foreign policy. I do not believe so. Only 
western polities apply because I strictly denounce a foreign interventionist policy; liberal institutions, even 
if they are more just, only work if the people want them. And more fundamentally, countries have no right 
to undermine the sovereignty of other nations. 
96 She seems to indicate this in the epilogue of ​Justice and the Politics of Difference​, see page 258. 
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becomes a rather sophisticated form of liberal egalitarian theory where we tolerate groups only              
insofar as they do not oppress others. In the fourth section, this is precisely what I will argue we                   
should do with her five faces, but Young has no obvious route out of this conundrum like I do                   
because she wants cultural affinity to matter just as much as “bourgeois” liberal rights. Under               
her theory, and any that espouses culture as a positive right, groups receive their multicultural               
protections irrespective of whether the group has just beliefs, like equal respect for women and               
LGBTQ+. This is a fundamental, inherent flaw in multiculturalism as a theory, and we must               
reject it because of this. 
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Section 4: Substantial Liberal Solutions 
 
Thus far, I have solely focused on criticisms of multiculturalism and what I believe to be                
its untenable but intrinsic flaws. However, I have not offered any reason to think substantial               
liberalism can provide meaningful solutions to the problems that multiculturalism was           
developed to address. Detailing the ways liberalism can will comprise the remainder of this              
thesis. Before I begin, I want to clarify that I do not think that substantial liberalism perfectly                 
solves the issues multiculturalism seeks to. What I am instead arguing is that substantial              
liberalism can address the concerns of multiculturalism well enough that, given all the flaws I               
demonstrated multiculturalism to have, we should adopt substantial liberalism instead of           
multiculturalism. 
To begin offering a meaningful alternative proposal, the liberal egalitarian movement           
needs to do two things: abandon the distributive paradigm as the only basis for justice, and, at                 
least for non-distributive questions, abandon ideal theory. My rejection of the distributive            
paradigm are for the same reasons that Young provides, which I detailed in her exegesis. The                
essence of her critique is that there are simply some issues that seem to pertain to justice --                  
particularly culture issues such as a sense of respect each person feels for fellow citizens -- that                 
are unquantifiable and therefore unable to be “distributed” in any meaningful sense. It is              
unclear what distributive justice can tell us about how to solve the proclivity of the police to                 
racially profile blacks or end hate crimes against Muslim Americans. Justice must also account              
for how cultural norms prevent people from becoming free and equal citizens. The moment we               
take an interest in fighting the ways cultural norms play a role in continuing oppression, we                
think justice accounts for issues outside the distribution of things and therefore have left the               
distributive paradigm.  
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The second reason, rejecting ideal theory, is just as important. ​Rawls, for instance,             
avoids the problems that multiculturalism seeks to engage in -- how institutions should treat              
minority groups, how to rectify past injustices, how to deal with social and cultural biases               
against minority groups -- through his use of ideal theory. ​Rawls assumes a relatively              
homogenous state in ​A Theory of Justice in which there were no racially motivated injustices,               
but that is of no use for us because the United States, and increasingly Europe, is not                 
homogenous, and such injustices did occur. ​Anyone who wants to contribute productive            
philosophical theory about how to best remedy previous injustices must grapple with these             
fundamentally nonideal problem. Charles W. Mills offers the most stark expression of the             
problem with using ideal theory to wrestle with the questions multiculturalism raises. Mills             
argues that ideal theory makes Rawls’ work useless when thinking about major issues in racial               
justice: 
So the ideal Rawlsian Society will not be a racist one, and its “basic structure” will not 
have been founded on racial exclusion… in this framework then, there is no need for 
affirmative action, reparations, or other measures of corrective racial justice because no 
racial group will have been discriminated against in the first place. But this will obviously 
be of scant comfort and little guidance to those members of groups who in the actual, 
non-ideal world have been discriminated against. … Prescriptions for remedial justice in 
a racist social order are not the same as prescriptions for ideal justice in a non-racist 
social order, nor can they be straightforwardly extracted from them by, say, the 
invocation of “justice as fairness” since the very question at issue, obviously, is exactly 
what fairness demands of us in this situation.  
97
 
Note though, that Mills does not say that theorists should abandon liberalism or the Rawlsian               
theory writ large. Rather the solution he offers is simply a revision of Rawls’ hypothetical               
contract to derive principles between individuals who do not know their race but who do know                
they could have been disadvantaged by it in the society they are devising their principles of                
justice for. He likes the Rawlsian idea that we should strive for a society based upon Kantian                 
98
97 Charles W. Mills, “Repairing the Racial Contract” in ​Contract and Domination​ (Cambridge UK: Polity 
Press, 2007), 113-4 
98 Ibid, 118-132. 
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respect for persons and thereby create a society of free and equal persons. His objection is that                 
racially disadvantaged groups continue to lose out on their fair share of social and distributive               
goods which a fair hypothetical contract would arrive at because of “discriminatory practices             
wrong by mainstream standards, and their cumulative outcome over decades.” So just            
99
stipulating the problem of racial and cultural injustice away because it runs contrary to the               
principles a hypothetical contract would ideally create only obfuscates a major social problem             
and renders that theory useless for solving it. I agree entirely with Mills here. Rawls’ idealized                
methodology in ​A Theory of Justice is insufficient for questions of rectification and cultural              
identity, but that doesn’t mean that the end goals of the text are not still worth aspiring for. How                   
we can use nonideal means to arrive at the powerful vision of society that Rawls offers as ideal is                   
what I hope to provide for the rest of this section.  
So with those two problems in mind, the basis for my proposed solution comes from               
Elizabeth Anderson’s paper “What is the Point of Equality?”. The paper introduced her theory of               
“relational equality”, which steps outside the distributive paradigm to argue that equality should             
be measured, not by how goods are divided, but by how equal social relationships between               
individuals are. Thus, liberal egalitarians who adopt a relational view of equality, as I do, believe                
the following: 
[relational equality] repudiates distinctions of moral worth based on birth or social            
identity -- on family membership, inherited social status, race, ethnicity, gender, or            
genes. There are no natural slaves, plebeians, or aristocrats…. all competent adults are             
equally moral agents: everyone equally has the power to develop and exercise moral             
responsibility, to cooperate with others according to principles of justice, to shape and             
fulfill a conception of their good.  
100
 
What separates relational equality from any form of libertarianism is the belief that the state               
has an obligation to involve itself in the process of creating these equal persons, mainly through                
99 Ibid, 129. 
100 Elizabeth Anderson, “What is the Point of Equality?” ​Ethics​ 109, no. 3. 1999: 312. 
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redistribution of income and improving, upholding, and enforcing anti-discrimination law.          
There are some modern libertarians would would not oppose many of the positions of relational               
equality, and I highly encourage them to pursue as much of the picture I present here as                 
101
possible. In her paper, Anderson explicitly invokes Young’s five faces of oppression as the              
standard by which we can evaluate whether a society is living up to the standard of relational                 
equality. I agree. It might sound strange that I am adopting the five faces of oppression for a                  
102
liberal framework of rights, but I actually think this is quite natural. Eliminating the five faces                
achieves a society of free and equal persons. Each of the five faces is a restriction on the liberty                   
of the affected individuals in a polity. The best way to secure a social arrangement that mirrors                 
Rawls’ liberty principle in a nonideal world where racial discrimination defines our social             
institutions and continues to influence society is to target the structural bases for those ideas,               
and the five faces of oppression is thus far the best metric for evaluating those institutions. As                 
Anderson puts it, “equality is a cultural norm, not only a legal status.” The result of doing this,                  
103
when comparing the ideal theory in ​A Theory of Justice to nonideal theory in ​Justice and the                 
Politics of Difference​, will look very similar. There will be minor differences however. The              
biggest difference comes in that a substantial liberal theory rejects Young’s multicultural            
impulses. This is because of a critical schism between how substantial liberalism and Young see               
the nature of “difference”. She sees “difference” as a normative good worth fostering. Relational              
equality views difference as neither good nor bad, but that because minority groups are              
adversely affected for those normatively irrelevant qualities, that institutions must take steps to             
eliminate the unjust disadvantages that harm them. Young seeks a “community of            
101 I’m thinking here of many Arizona style neoclassical libertarians who oppose many of the social 
oppressions present in the relational stance, and maybe even favor some redistributive policies, while still 
maintaining skepticism about public/nationalized features of the economy (like public transportation or 
public schools). I don’t think much of the proposal I offer here is antithetical to many of their beliefs. 
102 “What is the Point of Equality?”, 312. 
103 Elizabeth Anderson, ​The Imperative of Integration​ (Princeton NJ: Princeton University  
Press, 2010), 102.  
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communities”, while liberalism aspires for a series of social relations between individuals who             
voluntarily work together in pursuit of a more just society. What the difference means concretely               
is that any collective movement is strictly pragmatic, and that oppressed members of the society               
must integrate into the majority society.  
What Anderson achieves in “What is the Point of Equality?” is the realization of a theory                
that respects the dignity and rights of minority groups without acquiescing to multicultural             
demands that threaten the value placed on the individual autonomy and liberty which makes a               
society of free and equal persons possible. If we are serious about eradicating the forms of                
oppression that the five faces highlight, then we must believe ethical norms supersede cultural              
norms. We simply cannot tolerate groups who seek to create unjust hierarchies, much less              
arrange codified group differences that allow them to forgo the individual rights and protections              
that western societies have fought for, and which are so overwhelmingly beneficial to realizing              
racial and sexual equality.  
Despite using the five faces of oppression as the basis for justice, relational equality is               
firmly a liberal theory of justice. The state is not imprisoning or fining people for making                
comments even if those comments do hamper relational equality, nor does a just society dictate               
how someone must vote. But while it respects individual’s rights to make those decisions, it               
relentlessly pursues institutional changes that do affirm the equality of all the members of a               
polity, and is perfectly willing to prosecute any acts of violence that are inflicted upon vulnerable                
groups. The state cannot cannot allow any group to abnegate their responsibility in creating a               
society of free and equal persons through multicultural protections of intragroup injustices, but             
neither does it ignore the vulnerability of minority groups. If a group is imposing or tolerating                
one of the five faces of oppression, then they may not hide behind religious conviction or                
cultural ignorance (unless they could somehow prove there was a legitimate ought-implies-can            
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restriction on their knowledge). Those groups are violating the ability for individuals to live free               
of oppression, and that fundamentally violates the status of people as free and equal. One of the                 
more distinctive ways relational equality embodies the liberal tradition is the belief that central              
to eliminating the five faces of oppression is ending the suppression of an individual’s ability to                
pursue the ends or identity that they choose. Relational equality rejects any notion that there is                
some way to “be” a member of any group, and so it takes the issue of groups repressing                  
individuality seriously. This is one of the primary ways it differs from Young’s theory -- she lacks                 
this dimension of individual freedom from groups -- and it is because of this that she sees no                  
problem with multicultural policies. Relational equality sees multiculturalism, and the scripts it            
produces, as another manifestation of oppression,. 
What emerges from relational equality for our purposes is two proposals: integrationism            
and pragmatic collective solidarity. To Young and other multicultural theorists, the idea that             
justice demands minority groups integrate into a larger society to become free and equal citizens               
might sound paradoxical, but I argue it is not so long as it is understood that relational equality                  
demands more than just respect for individual rights from each member of the polity. I believe I                 
can assuage this concern by fleshing out what integration entails and the steps it takes to respect                 
the cultural and ethnic identities that individuals within those groups value.  
Integration is the liberal egalitarian explanation for how minority groups can become            
part of a society of free and equal persons without sacrificing individual integrity and dignity.               
My main inspiration for what integrationism demands derives from Anderson’s book ​The            
Imperative of Integration​, which analyzes the way she believes black members of society can              
best achieve relational equality. There are several substantive differences between integration           
and assimilation. The largest difference is a cultural one,  
Unlike the ideal of assimilation, integration does not view the disadvantaged           
communities as the only ones that need to change. Integration aims to transform the              
habits of the dominant groups. It is a tool for breaking down stigmatization, stereotypes,              
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and discrimination. Most important, it aims at constructing a superordinate group           
identity through which its members regard one another as equals, pool the local             
knowledge that they have acquired in more parochial settings to solve shared problems,             
and hold one another to account.  
104
 
Note how integration fits into all the different themes that liberal egalitarians aspire for:              
Autonomy for the individual is preserved and achieved it seeks to create a society in which                
people are able to pursue their aims and goals without prejudice so long as they respect that                 
same right for everyone else; the individuality of each person in an integrationist model is               
respected and maintained, for one’s identity is never dependent upon adherence to an             
essentializing set of laws that determine which group someone fits into; and lastly it elevates               
equal social relations between individuals to be the most fundamental priority of institutional             
design. In other words, it preserves justice as the first virtue of social institutions.  
And yet, integration is still a meaningful platform for liberals to adopt to tackle              
discrimination. It requires challenging and questioning the norms that members of the            
dominant group take for granted, acknowledging the way that implicit bias plays such an              
extensive role in our society, and furthermore accepting and appreciating the ways in which              
105
minority groups’ cultures improve and enhance our societies. Integration is a cultural shift in              
addition to a platform of institutional changes. These cultural changes are just as necessary as               
institutional reforms because, as Anderson puts it, “Even when people observe           
antidiscrimination laws, and so avoid ‘discrimination by contract,’ they may still practice            
‘discrimination by contact,’ which often involves shunning of marginalized groups by avoiding            
neighborly, collegial, or friendly relationships with them.” Thus, integration requires that we            
106
104 ​The Imperative of Integration​, 115-6 
105 For two powerful discussions of the ways biases and intuitions control our thinking, see the first section 
of Jonathan Haidt’s ​The Righteous Mind​, and Daniel Kahneman’s entire book ​Thinking Fast and Slow​. 
Both explore how the conscious thoughts we have are dependent upon many unconscious and intuition 
based judgments that we often are not even aware of.  
106 ​The Imperative of Integration​, 116. 
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work towards diminishing bias within a society. Anderson offers remedies for this challenge in              
section 6.3-4. She also offers a model of affirmative action in chapter seven predicated upon               
Dworkin’s instrumentalist defense of the practice. These measures are necessary, though at            
107
times undesirable, because they create two of the most important elements of true integration:              
the destigmatization of minority groups, and the capacity to cooperate despite differences. In             
other words, integration is key to teaching people how to work together despite substantive              
differences in cultural background and conceptions of the good that would otherwise cause great              
social strain. Measures like affirmative action are steps both to redress inequalities that violate              
reasonable principles of justice and to provide members of deprived groups opportunities, even             
if through government intervention, which will produce better and more just social outcomes in              
the long term. Those who accuse affirmative action of violating the liberal individuality of an               
applicant ignore the enormous value a diversity of views offers for any institution in the same                
way any other innate and undeserved attribute, like intelligence, provides. 
I now turn to the second component of relational equality: pragmatic collective            
solidarity. My primary inspiration for the idea comes from Tommie Shelby’s work ​We Who Are               
Dark​, and his exploration of how members of the black community can best become a politically                
efficacious group for black needs without falling victim to the threat of scripts. Shelby rejects the                
essentializing model of “classical black nationalism” that was the basis for the Black Power              
Movement in the late 1960s and has dominated public conceptions of black solidarity since its               
inception. 
In place of classical black nationalism, Shelby offers pragmatic solidarity as a modified             
conception of political solidarity. Pragmatic solidarity is the liberal explanation for how society             
attempts to address the five faces of oppression, which are difficult to address at a purely                
107 For Dworkin’s defense see, “Reverse Discrimination” in ​Taking Rights Seriously​, 223-240. 
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individualistic level because of each face’s largely social nature, while still respecting individual             
autonomy and rights. Ideally, the government would take an active role in understanding and              
helping minority groups end their oppression, but more realistically, government action will            
come through activism. So the question is then how should groups organize themselves to              
advance their needs in government. In attempting to answer this, we are then faced with two                
choices, exemplified by classical and pragmatic nationalism. So although Shelby uses these            
terms to specifically discuss types of black solidarity, these concepts can fairly easily apply to the                
social movements of other oppressed racial or cultural minorities. Shelby describes the two             
forms of solidarity thusly: 
According to classical nationalism, black solidarity and voluntary separation under          
conditions of equality and self-determination is a worthwhile end in itself. On this             
account, blacks should unite and work together because they are a people with their own               
distinctive ethnoracial identity; and as a cohesive national group, blacks have interests            
that are best pursued by their seeking group autonomy within some relatively            
independent institutional framework. However, according to pragmatic nationalism,        
blacks should unite and work together because they suffer a common oppression; and             
given the current political climate they can make progress in overcoming or ameliorating             
their shared condition only if they embrace black solidarity. Here, black unity is merely a               
contingent strategy for creating greater freedom and equality for blacks.  
108
 
Classical nationalism is based upon an “ethnocultural” conception of solidarity, which argues            
that members of the black community have an obligation to “embrace and preserve their              
distinctive ethnic or cultural identity.” But if members of the black community adhere to this               
109
ethnocultural view, then we have returned right back to scripts, for note how that classical               
nationalism is predicated upon the idea that there is some quality about blacks that makes their                
separation from society both possible and worthwhile. If belonging to the black community is to               
belong to a specific cultural identity that is beyond one’s choice, then that means there are                
modes of “authentic” blackness that members of the community must adhere to or else they are                
108 Tommie Shelby, ​We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations for Black Solidarity​ (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 201-2 
109 Ibid, 217. 
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in some sense betraying their community. Any view that results in someone’s preferences             
becoming a type of betrayal is deeply disrespectful to the individuals whose preferences deviate              
from the cultural norms.  
The pragmatic solidarity model has several advantages over the classical nationalist           
attitude that supports a multicultural theory. The first is that this form of social solidarity is                
entirely volitional, ​i.e. while it is undoubtedly prudent for oppressed groups to join together, if               
they do not wish to do so, then they do not have to. An individual’s physiological features are                  
only as explicitly politicized by the oppressed person as one wishes them to be. In many cases,                 
society’s implicit politicization will understandably compel people to seek demands of justice,            
but members of an oppressed class should not be forced into that position if they for whatever                 
reason deem this undesirable or unnecessary. This volitional component avoids both any            
concerns about the division problem I referenced in section 3 -- for the groups are only as                 
divided as they choose to be -- and any worry about creating scripts. The only basis for                 
pragmatic solidarity is the majority society’s denial of full rights for minority groups, which they               
as citizens are legitimately entitled to. This means that solidarity is predicated on a guaranteed               
shared experience, those who do not feel compelled to join a solidarity movement because they               
do not think they suffer from enough oppression to warrant such action face no requirement to                
join the movement. There is no claim about what form of activism is demanded of someone if                 
they happen to belong to an oppressed group. 
The third advantage pragmatic solidarity has over classical solidarity is that it better             
matches the latest work on the social ontology of race, notably the dominant theory of social                
constructionism. ​Aaron Griffith defines social constructionism by saying,  
race is real but has a social reality rather than a biological one. Race is real for the                  
constructionist because it is causally efficacious, it figures in social scientific inductions,            
inferences, predictions, and explanations, and because it normatively structures our          
lived experience. Race is social, on the other hand, because it is a product of human                
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social interaction. For the social constructionist, race is something like the social            
significance of morphology (skin color, hair type, eye shape, etc.) and ancestry.  
110
 
The pragmatic model thus acknowledges that race or ethnicity or gender currently causes the              
individuals with those qualities to suffer from oppressions, but it also sees how arbitrary these               
features are, and the ways in which they confine people and their actions. Pragmatic solidarity               
therefore has a better account for both sides of the social constructionist coin. It acknowledges               
the causal efficacy of race and offers solutions that do not place white people in a superior                 
position, but it also rejects any notion that a just society would maintain that social construction                
of race when it bears no relation to how members of that race want to pursue a conception of the                    
good. 
What I have just related is the way that relational equality can answer the theoretical               
concerns and issues surrounding multiculturalism, but there is a legitimate question as to how              
the principles of integrationism and pragmatic solidarity would play out across various issues             
Taylor, Young, and Kymlicka raise. To provide a somewhat clearer picture of what I envision, I                
will look at Taylor’s multicultural theory of education and then finally offer a reply to Kymlicka’s                
equality argument that I think will mitigate much of the power it ostensibly has against a theory                 
of institutional benign neglect.  
Taylor argued that multiculturalism demands that minority groups are deliberately          
educated through teaching their specific cultural achievements to realize a form of cognitive             
emancipation from the demeaning and oppressive images they have frequently received of            
themselves by the pedagogy of dominant groups. Relational equality recognizes that only ever             
learning about the intellectual accomplishments of a single demographic distorts the self-respect            
the members of a polity outside the represented demographic internalize. So relational equality             
is much in favor of an educational program that better incorporates the myriad             
110 Aaron Griffith, “Realizing Race,” ​Philosophical Studies​. Published Online March 30, 2019 
 
 
 
  ​                                        Siegmund 67 
accomplishments of those outside the western canon. The difference between Taylor and            
relational equality comes in that while Taylor believes the state should customize each minority              
group’s educational program to achieve the liberation of each group, relational equality views a              
shared education as a powerful opportunity to further both a sense of commonality among              
citizens and a better sense of empathy between groups. When white students read Toni              
Morrison or ZZ Packer, they enter the perspective of those authors who in important ways have                
lived disparate lives from those white students. ​Midnight’s Children​, ​100 Years of Solitude​, and              
Things Fall Apart have all quickly and enthusiastically entered the literary canon, and so for               
students to read them is to appreciate the ways the masterpieces of literature have expanded               
beyond Homer, Shakespeare, Cervantes, and Joyce. This in turns helps everyone appreciate the             
literary, artistic, and cultural contributions of those minority groups, not just those groups             
themselves. Creating the opportunity for everyone to appreciate those cultural contributions is a             
critical step to achieving a society where each person view everyone else, regardless of race or                
cultural heritage, as equals. Members of the dominant group need the chance in their own               
education to recognize and appreciate the contributions of oppressed minorities for a true             
equality to emerge, and limiting education of a group’s contribution just to that group prevents               
the necessary step of other groups recognizing an oppressed group’s achievements. 
This picture of education might seem overly romantic both in its scope and efficacy, and               
indeed in practice it would fall far short of the justification I provided, but all the state can ever                   
guarantee is the creation of opportunities for students, and citizens generally, to appreciate the              
artistic and cultural contributions of oppressed groups. No one can force someone to empathize              
with someone else or appreciate the achievements of people outside their own group, but what               
the state can do is end an overemphasis on the western canon. Over time, this will help change                  
the conception many people have of other groups through helping overcome the “see it to               
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believe it” hurdle, ​i.e. that it is more difficult for someone to believe a black woman can be a                   
great artist until that person sees a great black, female artist.  
The generalizable principle from this example is that we need to think about how to help                
both dominant groups and minority groups move to a situation of relational equality. Relational              
equality has no disagreement with helping oppressed groups escape a marginalizing view of             
themselves, but just as critical to the success of relational equality is that dominant groups shift                
their attitudes toward oppressed groups. This latter challenge will come primarily through            
creating shared avenues of experience, of which education is one major way. Multiculturalism             
fails to acknowledge how those shared spaces and experiences are necessary for equality within              
a society, and instead myopically seeks only to help minority groups shake oppressed views of               
themselves. This is a valuable and essential step, but will never complete the task of creating a                 
society of equals. 
I now return to Kymlicka’s equality argument. I acknowledge that ​Kymlicka is correct             
that denying group difference in the way benign neglect and substantial liberalism endorse will              
disadvantage minority groups in some circumstances. So while limited in scope, the equality             
argument believes that it has advocated for multicultural rights on liberalism’s own terms, and if               
there are some multicultural rights possible under liberal individualism and desire for fairness,             
then we should adopt Kymlicka’s multicultural policies instead of substantial liberalism. It is this              
last apodosis that I am rejecting, because while this is a bullet that substantial liberalism must                
partially bite, substantial liberalism is not nearly as incompetent at accommodating difference as             
Kymlicka suggests, and also has none of the disadvantages I discussed in section 3. 
Take, for instance, his example of a courthouse not being able to be neutral among               
languages. I take his his point -- native english speakers do have a built in advantage. The                 
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problem is that I am not sure what he realistically offers as an alternative. What would it mean in                   
this context for there to be equality in the courts? Should we have courthouses speaking different                
languages within the United States? If so, how would we ever determine which languages are               
ubiquitous enough in a region or district to deserve their own courthouse? These kinds of               
questions plague the public policy component of Kymlicka’s argument. Far more plausible than             
multicultural rights in this case would be the belief that someone who cannot speak whatever               
language is used in the courthouse -- and it should be the dominant group’s for simplicity and                 
efficiency -- should be guaranteed a translator. That does not violate the benign neglect model,               
because you have a positive right to a fair trial, and that involves knowing what is occurring in                  
your own trial. Providing a translator fulfills the requirements of relational equality as well, for it                
respects the fact that the defendant cannot just learn the majority language. So the defendant is                
provided all the resources by the state needed to receive a fair trial under the benign neglect                 
model. It is unclear what multiculturalism could demand further, unless the implication for the              
equality argument is truly that the state has an obligation to undergo the massive enterprise of                
constructing a large number of new courthouses, hire a large number of judges able to speak the                 
relevant foreign languages, and somehow fit this into the federal and state court structure. Even               
ignoring the issues of what would happen in the appeal circuits, this idea is absurd. 
Kymlicka’s argument overstates what benign neglect entails the government cannot do,           
for positive universal rights will overlap with many of the issues that multiculturalism wants to               
create particularist rights for. Benign neglect does not entail that the state takes no interest in                
guaranteeing its citizens rights universal rights through a varied context of what it might take to                
achieve those rights. Having a positive right to something entails that the government take steps               
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to guarantee that those rights are accessible to its citizens. In saying that there are positive                
universal rights, relational equality acknowledges the way minority groups are disadvantaged in            
various institutional contexts, and therefore believes that steps must be made to integrate those              
minority groups into those institutional and legal structures for them to receive their universal              
rights.  
In my rejection of group rights, there is one exception I think must be recognized, and it                 
is for Native American Tribes. It is only because of egregious injustices that the tribes today are                 
stuck on reservations and at the mercy of American law. Furthermore, these tribes are still               
discrete groups. That is, they are easily identifiable groups who grant tribal status in the same                
way that the United States or Canada may grant citizenship. When both these facts are               
combined, there is a moral impetus for the United States or Canada to respect and maintain                
these tribes’ sovereignty, both because it never should have been restricted in the first place, and                
because we can still clearly identify the members of those tribes (avoiding the Division              
Problem). They thus share the same status that sovereign foreign nations do in relation to liberal                
countries, ​i.e. they stand outside the bounds of a liberal government’s right to enforce policies of                
relational equality. Other groups Kymlicka identifies as non-anglophone nations within America           
and Canada, such as French Canada and Puerto Rico, have no such rights. French Canada was                
itself a colonizing force and therefore has no right claim that they shouldn’t have been               
conquered, imposed upon, or confined to reservations the way the Native Americans do. I would               
argue Puerto Rico, because of its clear preference to become a state in the United States, is not                  
111
due the reparations the way Native American tribes. They clearly want to belong to institutions               
which at least nominally support liberal rights and therefore are forfeiting any claim to maintain               
111 Frances Robles, “23% of Puerto Ricans Vote in Referendum, 97% for Statehood,” The New York 
Times, June 11, 2017. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/11/us/puerto-ricans-vote-on-the-question-of-statehood.html?_r=0 
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external protections. To become a state in the United States is to be incorporated into its larger                 
federal structure and the principles lying beneath it.  
What happens if dominant groups refuse the terms of “relational equality”? This is             
perhaps the most vexing question facing both modern center-left organizations and theories of             
justice that both engage in non-ideal theory and dare assume any good intentions from people.               
The corruption of power -- even in the cases of gender, sexual, and racial privileges enjoyed by                 
dominant groups in western societies -- are things that have proven difficult to dispel. I do                
remain guardedly optimistic in the sense that the United States, despite the regressions it is               
currently undergoing, has largely moved forward in the past sixty years. I have no solution for                
how to quickly convince people that they must give up the social powers and privileges they                
have, but I will say that any solution must appeal to commonality. The battle for achieving a                 
society of free and equal people in the United States is especially uphill because of the tensions                 
that result from our flawed human preferences for people who look and sound like us. The cost                 
112
of a racial and culturally pluralist society is, therefore, the need for unity in other areas of                 
society. The idea that we can achieve social equality by only emphasizing difference is only ever                
going to exacerbate social divisions, and barring deeply undemocratic shifts in power, only             
further entrench the powers of the dominant group, which at least for now constitutes the               
numerical majority of people. My point is not that we should ignore differences and the ways                
those difference result in injustices -- that is the fundamental problem with how liberalism has               
functioned -- but rather that the only chance oppressed groups have of convincing dominant              
groups to give up their privileges and accept terms of equality is by appealing to common                
features or traits. Multiculturalism ignores this reality; relational equality does not.  
112 ​The Righteous Mind​, 210; as well as footnote 69 on page 359 for further sources. 
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Conclusion​: What I hoped to have achieved in this mere overview of the major              
multicultural literature is threefold. First, establish that even the softest and most lenient forms              
of multiculturalism will inexorably impose an unacceptable cost on individuals trying to live             
their lives. Second, that the ways people lead they lives within cultural groups requires a kind of                 
respect that codifying and thereby reifying group identity does not allow for. And third, that               
substantial liberalism captures the proper conception of the relation between normativity and            
culture, ​i.e​. that the normative demands justice places on individuals receives a lexicographical             
priority over our cultural sentiments. This is not to deny the critical importance of culture in                
forming our identity, but that we must also respect the ways in which culture is conceptually                
separate from questions of justice, even if our culture confines our “boundaries of the              
imaginable”. 
Despite primarily focusing my criticisms on multiculturalism, I also hope to have            
conveyed the many ways that substantial liberalism must improve its own concern for             
non-distributive social inequalities. The first major prescription is to abandon ideal theory for             
such concerns. I do think ideal theory can help answer some questions, but Young and Anderson                
have put to rest any conceit that the questions of justice end there. The second prescription is                 
that liberalism must move beyond the distributive paradigm. Questions about the nature of             
identity and culture are outside the confines of distributive justice, and so if liberalism continues               
to pursue only distributive questions, it will continue to appear unable to answer important              
questions about the relationship between justice and identity. Liberalism’s “contextual          
individual” represents an incredible synthesis of debates about our capacity to choose, and the              
grounding that cultural norms provide for that capacity. This cautious individualism is            
liberalism’s greatest strength, for belief in individual rights, the good of autonomy, and             
respecting a Millian style harm principle, when combined with a relational theory of justice, is               
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the best way to answer the challenges multiculturalism poses to liberalism while setting             
definitive bounds on tolerable actions. The integrationist ethic I explored in the fourth section              
explores how individualism can integrate minority groups into the polity while respecting many             
of the cultural qualities they deserve to have respected. Integration, as opposed to assimilation,              
recognizes the failures and flaws in the dominant culture, and seeks to change oppressive biases               
and norms. If we want a society of free and equal persons, then we must acknowledge that                 
western society has disadvantaged minority groups, even in the present day. Our society has              
consistently failed to live up to the ideals that we have proclaimed are the foundation of our                 
institutions, and we therefore have a strong and exigent obligation to eliminate the failures that               
our institutions and cultural norms have created. Our institutions continue to cause minority             
groups enormous harm through the stigmatization and alienation our society creates, and it is              
something we must redress in order to realize the promise of a just society based upon the                 
robust moral foundation of the harm principle and Kantian autonomy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ​                                        Siegmund 74 
References 
Al-Hibri, Azizah Y. “Is Western Patriarchal Feminism Good for Third World/Minority Women?”  
in ​Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?​ Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999:  
41-47. 
Anderson, Benedict. ​Imagined Communities​. Brooklyn NY: Verso Books, 3rd ed. 1983, 2006.  
Anderson, Elizabeth. ​The Imperative of Integration​. Princeton NJ: Princeton University  
Press, 2010. 
Anderson, Elizabeth. “What is the Point of Equality?” ​Ethics​ 109, no. 3. (1999): 287-337. 
Appiah, Kwame Anthony. ​Ethics of Identity​. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005.  
Appiah, Kwame Anthony. ”Identity, Authenticity, Survival” in ​Multiculturalism: Examining  
the Politics of Respect​. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 1994: 149-163. 
 
Bhabha, Homi K. “Liberalism’s Sacred Cow” in ​Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?  
Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999: 79-85. 
Dworkin, Ronald. “The Liberal Community.” ​California Law Review​ 77, no. 3 (1989): 479-504 
Dworkin, Ronald. ​Taking Rights Seriously​. London UK: Duckworth, 6th ed. 1977, 1991. 
Griffith, Aaron. “Realizing Race.” ​Philosophical Studies​. Published Online March 30, 2019 
Kahneman, Daniel. ​Thinking Fast and Slow​. New York NY: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2011. 
Kymlicka, Will. ​Multicultural Citizenship​. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 1995.  
MacIntyre, Alasdair. ​After Virtue​. Notre Dame IN: Notre Dame Press, 2nd ed. 1981, 1984.  
Nozick, Robert. ​Anarchy, State, and Utopia​. Cornwall UK: Blackwell Publishing, 1974. 
Parekh, Bhikhu. “A Varied Moral World” in ​Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?​ Princeton  
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999: 69-75. 
 
Pateman, Carole and Mills, Charles W. ​Contract and Domination​. Cambridge UK: Polity  
Press, 2007. 
Phillips, Anne. ​Multiculturalism without Culture​. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press,  
2007. 
Putnam, Robert. “​E Pluribus Unum​: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century”  
Scandinavian Political Studies​ 30, no. 2 (2007): 137-174. 
 
 
 
  ​                                        Siegmund 75 
Okin, Susan. “Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?” in ​Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?  
Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999: 9-24. 
Rawls, John. ​A Theory of Justice​. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2nd ed. 1971, 1999. 
Rawls, John. “The Basic Liberties and their Priority.” ​The Tanner Lectures on Human Values​.  
The University of Michigan, 1981. 
Robles, Frances.  “23% of Puerto Ricans Vote in Referendum, 97% for Statehood.” The New  
York Times. June 11, 2017.  
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/11/us/puerto-ricans-vote-on-the-question-of-st 
atehood.html?_r=0 
Sandel, Michael. ​Liberalism and the Limits of Justice​. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University  
Press, 2nd ed. 1982, 1998. 
Shelby, Tommie. ​We Who are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations for Black Solidarity​.  
Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2005.  
Tamir, Yael. ​Liberal Nationalism​. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.  
Taylor, Charles. ​Philosophical Arguments​. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1995. 
Taylor, Charles. “The Politics of Recognition” in ​Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of  
Recognition​. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2nd ed. 1992, 1994: 23-75. 
Tomasi, John. “Kymlicka, Liberalism, and Respect for Cultural Minorities,” ​Ethics​ 105, no. 3  
(1995): 580-603 
Walzer, Michael. “The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism.” ​Political Theory​ 18, no. 1  
(1990): 6-23 
Young, Iris Marion. ​Inclusion and Democracy​. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Young, Iris Marion. ​Justice and the Politics of Difference​. Princeton NJ: Princeton University  
Press, 1990. 
 
